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SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW, SOMETHING BORROWED, SOMETHING LONG OVERDUE: THE EVOLUTION OF A
"SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BLIND" LEGAL SYSTEM IN MARYLAND
AND THE RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
1.

INTRODUCTION

Thomas Jefferson once opined that the United States Constitution
should be revised by each "new majority" and "handed on, with periodic repairs, from generation to generation to the end of time.'" Our
constitutional jurisprudence embraces an altogether different approach to revolution than that advocated by Jefferson. The bedrock
principle of a flexible, broadly-read Constitution which adapts to
changing circumstances allows revolution to occur at the judge's
bench rather than at the ballot box. 2 Historically, this revolutionary
impulse has resonated in generational expansions of substantive due
process and equal protection rights under our "living" Constitution. 3
1. JEAN M. YARBROUGH, AMERICAN VIRTUES: THOMAS JEFFERSON ON THE CHAR.
ACTER OF A FREE PEOPLE 118 (Univ. Press of Kan. 1998) (quoting Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Earle (Sept. 24, 1823), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 470-71 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed. 1907)). Jefferson advocated for frequent constitutional change because of his belief that
"one generation is to another as one independent nation is to another" and
that "the earth belongs to the living" and not bygone figures of past generations. DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAsJEFFERSON 302-03 (Univ. Press of Va. 1994) (quoting Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in ADRIENNE KOCH, JEFFERSON
AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 392-95 (Oxford Univ. Press
1950)).
2. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,407,415 (1819) ("[W]e must never
forget, it is a constitution we are expounding.... intended to endure for
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs."). The Supreme Court has rejected Jefferson's notion that a
majority of citizens may determine the individual rights of all citizens under
the Constitution. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624,638 (1943) ("One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a
free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."). Rather, it is the judiciary that interprets the Constitution and the
rights it bestows. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564, 577-78 (2003) (striking down
a Texas sodomy statute as violative of privacy rights protected by due process and overturning Bowers v. Hardwick's contrary ruling twenty years
prior); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116, 163-65 (1973) (invalidating a century-old Texas law criminalizing pre-viability abortions as violative of the
Due Process Clause); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding that segregation in public schools violated equal protection and discarding the nearly sixty year-old 'separate but equal' doctrine). See infra
text accompanying notes 165-68 for a discussion and explanation of Bowers.
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In fact, the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this principle in Lawrence v. Texas,4declaring that "[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom."5
The next generational revolution, and perhaps the final frontier, of
civil rights jurisprudence is that of the protection and equality of
homosexuals. Already, this generation has seen great strides forward
in the legal rights of gays and lesbians, particularly with respect to
marriage-like rights. 6 Maryland, however, still denies same-sex
couples the fundamental right to marry enjoyed by opposite-sex
couples,7 and the number of couples affected by this is profound.
The 2000 Census indicated that 12,632 same-sex couples resided in
Maryland, accounting for twelve percent of unmarried partner households in the state. 8 The lack of equality in marriage rights for homosexuals is especially problematic for a state that ranks sixteenth among
all states in the number of same-sex couple residents. 9 For the more
than 25,000 Maryland gays and lesbians in same-sex relationships, the
recognition of same-sex marriage is the one remaining, and most im4. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5. Id. at 579.
6. Compare Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass.
2003) (detennining that the exclusion of same-sex couples from entering
in to marriage violates state equal protection and due process guaran tees),
and Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the
Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution requires that samesex couples be granted the same benefits and protections of marriage
granted to opposite-sex couples), with Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 118991 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (finding that the ban on same-sex marriage does
not violate the state equal rights amendment), and Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) (declaring that neither the federal equal
protection nor the due process clause is offended by the state's prohibition
on same-sex marriage).
7. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2004) ("Only a marriage
between a man and a woman is valid in this State.").
8. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 U.S. CENSUS SUMMARY FILE 3 (2000), http://
www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/sumfile3.html (select "Data"
hyperlink; select "Detailed Tables" hyperlink; select "State" from dropdown
menu; add "Maryland" to Geography Selection; and follow to table
"PCTI "). Although the Census does not specifically track same-sex couples,
the U.S. Census Bureau has acknowledged that it diverts same-sex spouse
and like responses to the unmarried partner category. See U.S. CENSUS BuREAU, POPULATION DIVISION, Fertility & Family Statistics Branch, TECHNICAL
NOTE ON SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER DATA FROM THE 1990 AND 2000
CENSUSES (2001), http://www.census.gov/population/www/ cen2000/
samesex.html.
9. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS SUMMARY FILE 3 (2000), http://www.
census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/sumfile3.html (select "Data" hyperlink; select "Detailed Tables" hyperlink; select "All States" from dropdown
menu; and follow to table "PCTl"). Moreover, the 4,977 black same-sex
couples in the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan area is the second largest of such a demographic nationwide. Kelly Brewington, Caught Between
Gay, Black Worlds, BALT. SUN, Oct. 7, 2004, at 1A.
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portant, unrealized aspect of Maryland's "revolution" in sexual orientation equality.
Over the past decade, crucial facets of Maryland law have evolved,
equalizing the legal protections of homosexuals and heterosexuals. 1o
The resultant "orientation-blind" legal system, which has systematically abolished the disparate treatment of people based on their sexual orientation, cannot countenance the differentiation between the
rights of homosexuals and heterosexuals. Accordingly, under substantive due process analysis, the fundamental right to marry in Maryland
exercised by an opposite-sex couple is identical to the right of a samesex couple to marry. Maryland's marriage statute,l1 then, should be
declared unconstitutional to the extent that it limits valid marriages
only to opposite-sex couples.
This Comment will first discuss, in Part II, the development of sexual orientation equality in Maryland law with particular emphasis on
several critical family law decisions, changes to the criminal law, the
passage of landmark anti-discrimination measures, and the implications of a local ordinance that extended same-sex partnership benefits
to county employees. Finally, in light of Maryland's sexual orientation-blind legal system, Part III will analyze and vindicate the right to
same-sex marriage under the substantive due process standard applied to putative fundamental rights.

II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARYLAND'S "ORIENTATIONBLIND" LEGAL SYSTEM

Over the past decade, Maryland statutory, regulatory, and case law
have developed a trend of eliminating discrimination against homosexuals and equalizing the legal footing on which both homosexuals
and heterosexuals stand. 12 This movement towards increased equality
of sexual orientations spans the gamut of legal contexts and has accelerated in both its scope and effect in the past four years. I3 Some of
the most important developments have occurred in the jurisprudence
of family law, criminal law, anti-discrimination legislation, as well as
the extension of county same-sex partnership benefits.
A.

The Equalization of Homosexuals' Parental Rights in Maryland Family
Law

The equality of sexual orientations that has developed in the family
law context is one of the most compelling examples of this emerging
principle of equality in Maryland law and bears heavily on the argument for marriage equality. Over ten years ago, Maryland courts be10. See infra Part II.
11. FAM. LAw § 2-201.
12. See infra Part II.A-D.
13. See infra Part II.A.2-3, B, C.l.
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gan to specifically protect the parental rights of homosexuals by
eliminating the distinction between sexual orientations in determining those rights. 14 The courts firmly rejected the notion that homosexuals were unfit for the visitation, custody, and adoption of children
because of their sexual orientation. 15 These developments are particularly compelling for the recognition of same-sex marriage given the
deeply intimate and familial nature that is shared by parenthood and
marriage.
1.

The Visitation Rights of Homosexuals

In 1994, the full panel of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
grappled with the issue of homosexual parents' visitation rights in
North v. North,16 the first reported case of its kind in Maryland. 17 The
North court held that a lower trial court abused its discretion in denying a homosexual man overnight visitation of his children due to the
"perceived harms" resulting from his sexual orientation. 18 Notably, all
but one of the dissenting members of the court in North acknowledged
that any special weight given to Mr. North's homosexuality by the trial
court was improper. 19 The largest bloc of dissenters even agreed that
homosexuality, by itself, could not be used as a factor in denying visitation, nor could exposing children to such a sexual orientation be
deemed inherently harmful. 20 Judge Cathell's dissent espoused an approach indicative of the sexual orientation equality principle argued
in this Comment, stating, "I do not believe the issue should be treated
differently because of the appellant's homosexuality .... "21
Four years later, the Maryland Court of Appeals conclusively settled
the issue of visitation rights of homosexual parents in Boswell v. BoswelL 22 The case involved a couple who separated after the husband
revealed to his wife that he was a homosexual. 23 Invalidating a restric14. See North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1,648 A.2d 1025 (1994) (en bane). See
also infra Part IIA.1 for a discussion of this case.
15. See infra Part II.A.I-4.
16. 102 Md. App. 1, 648 A.2d 1025.
17. Hope D. Miller, The Maryland Suroey: 1998-1999: Recent Decisions: The Court of
Appeals of Maryland: Family Law, 59 MD. L. REv. 1132, 1143 (2000).
18. North, 102 Md. App. at 16, 648 A.2d at 1033 (holding the trial court's prohibition on Mr. North's overnight visitation to be inconsistent with his unsupervised day-time visitation).
19. Id. at 29-30, 648 A.2d at 1039 (Murphy, j., dissenting) (failing to comment
on the -relation between the visitation restriction and Mr. North's
homosexuality) .
20. Id. at 22, 648 A.2d at 1035 (Bishop, J., dissenting in which Fischer, j., concurs) ("We agree that there is no evidence in the record that Mr. North's
homosexuality would likely cause harm to his children or that Mr. North's
homosexuality, considered alone, should preclude overnight visitation

.... ").

21. Id. at 25, 648 A.2d at 1037 (Cathell, j., dissenting).
22. 352 Md. 204, 721 A.2d 662 (1998).
23. Id. at 210, 721 A.2d at 664.
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tion placed on the father's visitation, the Court of Appeals rejected
the lower court's rationale that the children's exposure to their father's homosexual relationship was a dispositive factor. 24 Instead, the
court favored a rule for evaluating the propriety of visitation orders
that "applies to both heterosexual and homosexual relationships"
equally.25 That rule requires that in all visitation cases, including ones
involving non-marital partners, restrictions on visitation should be reviewed under the best interests of the child standard. 26 The Boswell
court declared that, in such cases, the best interests are achieved by
inquiring whether an adverse impact is being made on the child, and
if so, whether that harm can be attributed to the child's contact with
the non-marital partner. 27 If no such connection can be found there
can be no restrictions placed on the non-custodial parent's visitation
rights. 28
In Boswell, the court also built on the holding of North and forbade
the denial or limitation of a parent's visitation of his or her child
based solely upon "one factor, such as a parent's ... homosexuality, to
the exclusion of all others."29 In fact, the court stressed the inherent
equality of the process by stating that" [w] e make no distinctions as to
the sexual preference of the non-custodial parent whose visitation is
being challenged."30 Thus, the Boswell court not only declined the
invitation to follow the trial court's declaration that non-marital homosexual relationships are per se deleterious to children in visitation
disputes,31 but also placed the non-marital relationships of homosexuals on the same plane as those of heterosexuals.
The court's insistence that determinations of child visitation be
made without respect to the non-custodial parent's homosexuality or
involvement in a same-sex relationshi p 32 created the foundation for
the sexual orientation-blind legal system in Maryland. In these early
cases, the court's equal treatment of homosexuals in the exercise of
their visitation rights was rooted in the basic comparability between
homosexual and heterosexual relationships.33 Equality for homosex24. Id. at 239-40, 721 A.2d at 679.
25. Id. at 237, 721 A.2d at 678.
26. Id. at 236-37, 721 A.2d at 678.
27. Id. at 237, 721 A.2d at 678.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 224, 721 A.2d at 671.
30. Id. at 237, 721 A.2d at 678.
31. Id. at 211,213-14,721 A.2d at 665-67 (quoting the trial court visitation order that "prohibited any overnight visitation and visitation with the children in the presence of [the father's gay partner] or 'anyone having
homosexual tendencies or such persuasions, male or female, or with anyone that the father may be living with in a non-marital relationship''').
32. See id. at 237, 721 A.2d at 678.
33. Indeed, psychologists have found that there is little difference between the
two types of relationships. See generally LETITIA ANNE PEPLAU & SUSAN D.
COCHRAN, A Relational Perspective on Homosexuality, in HOMOSEXUALI"IY/ HET.
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ual parents in North and Boswell though, was still based upon a comparison to a precedent or concurrent heterosexual relationship on the
part of the gay parent. 34 That paradigm changed in 2000 when the
Court of Special Appeals examined the viability of same-sex parenting
and the visitation rights of homosexual partners solely within the context of a same-sex relationship alone.
2.

Homosexual "De Facto" Parenthood and Visitation

In the groundbreaking case of S.F. v. M.D.,35 decided two years after
Boswell, the Court of Special Appeals encountered the issue of "de
facto parent" visitation after the dissolution of a "committed domestic
relationship" between two women. 36 As an initial step, the court recognized the existence of "de facto parents" within same-sex relationships in Maryland. 37 The court then held that such parents not only
have standing to seek visitation, but also that the parent requesting
visitation would not have to demonstrate unfitness of the biological
parent or "exceptional circumstances" to be awarded visitation. 38
Importantly, in its visitation analysis, the court in S.F. equated the
same-sex relationship of the two women with that of a married
couple. 39 This comparison is more than a convenient analogy for the
court. Rather, it is one of several indicative examples of the growing
consensus among courts in Maryland that families of same-sex partners function in much the same way as do families of opposite-sex
partners. 40 Thus, homosexual couples raising families deserve the le-

34.

35.
36.

37.

38.
39.
40.

EROSEXUALrIY. CONCEPTS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 321, 333-34 (David P. McWhirter, et aI., eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1990).
See Boswell, 352 Md. at 210, 721 A.2d at 664 (relating the facts of Mr. and
Mrs. Boswell's eight-year marriage); North v. North, 102 Md. App. 1, 3-4,
648 A.2d 1025, 1027 (1994) (en banc) (recounting Mr. North's problematic ten-year marriage to his wife).
132 Md. App. 99, 751 A.2d 9 (2000).
Id. at 102, 751 A.2d at 10-11. The phrase "committed domestic relationship," is the court's own term for describing the seven-year relationship between two women who cooperatively raised a child born as a result of
artificial insemination of one of the women. Id. at 102-03, 751 A.2d at lOll.
Id. at 111, 751 A.2d at 15. The court defined "de facto parent" vis-a.-vis its
recital of the elements a third party must satisfy to be considered such a
parent: "the legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship between the third party and the child; the third party must have lived with the
child; the third party must perform parental functions for the child to a
significant degree; and most important, a parent-child bond must be
forged." Id. (quoting V.G. v. MJ.B., 748 A.2d 539,551 (NJ. 2000»; see also
In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (listing the
four elements of de facto parenthood).
S.F., 132 Md. App. at 110-12, 751 A.2d at 15.
Id. at 112, 751 A.2d at 15 ("The case before us is most akin to a stepparent
seeking visitation. ").
See supra and infra Part II.A.I-4.
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gal equality granted to heterosexuals commensurate with their functional and conceptual equivalency.

3.

Custody Rights of Homosexuals

Child custody is another important family law issue for homosexual
couples as part of this trend of sexual orientation equality. In 2000,
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland weighed in on the issue of
granting child custody to homosexuals in Gestl v. FrederickY The case
involved a custody dispute filed under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) by Gestl, a Maryland woman, against her samesex partner, Frederick. 42 The UCCJA was invoked when Frederick
moved back to Tennessee five years after giving birth to the child the
couple was raising together in Maryland. 43 Mter the court determined that Maryland courts possessed jurisdiction under the
UCCJA,44 and that Tennessee did not present an available alternative
forum for the dispute to be heard,45 the court held that Gestl had
standing to claim custody of Frederick's biological child. 46
The Gestl court observed that Maryland law "recognizes a third
party's right to custody over a natural parent if exceptional circumstances exist which make it in the best interests of the child to award
custody to the third party."47 Further, the court stated that its reading
of the already seminal biological parent rights case of Troxel v. Granville48 was not inconsistent with this permissive formulation of custody
rights for non-biological parents. 49 In fact, due to Troxefs strong pre41. 133 Md. App. 216, 754 A.2d 1087 (2000).
42. Id. at 221-22, 754 A.2d at 1090.

43. Id.
44. Id. at 225-26, 754 A.2d at 1092-93.
45. Id. at 243, 754 A.2d at 1101. The court determined that Tennessee was not

46.

47.
48.

49.

an available alternative forum in this case specifically because its substantive
law would deny "a non-biological parent claiming to be a de facto parent"
the standing extended to such parents in Maryland. Id.
Id. at 244, 754 A.2d at 1102.
Id. at 241, 754 A.2d at 1100.
530 U.S. 57 (2000). In Troxel, the Supreme Court invalidated a Washington
non-parental visitation statute on substantive due process grounds because
the statute "impermissibly interfere[d] with the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children." Gestl, 133 Md. App. at 242,754 A.2d at 1101 (quoting Troxel,530
U.S. at 60, 66). The Court of Special Appeals in Gestl found it dispositive
that
[t]he Court expressly declined ... to reach the question of
whether parental unfitness was always a prerequisite in order to justify intervention in decisions concerning custody and visitation. It
also suggested that intervention in custody and visitation decisions
might be justified, when the intervention was 'founded ... on special factors,' rather than merely a generalized best interest analysis.
Id. at 242-43, 754 A.2d at 1001 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68).
Gestl, 133 Md. App. at 243, 754 A.2d at 1101.
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sumption in favor of biological parents,50 which is echoed in Maryland
law,51 and the inherent reality of same-sex relationships that only one
partner will be a biological parent, the custody rights of non-biological
same-sex parents announced in Gestl is likely the most permissive of all
the constitutionally-viable constructions possible.
The Gestl court ultimately found that Donna Gestl was a "person
acting as parent"52 and specifically allowed the opportunity for something that, at best, Boswell only implied 53 - that with the proper allegations, homosexuals could now be granted child custody without their
sexual orientation being used against them. 54 Importantly, this case
established custody rights for the partners of same-sex relationships
that mirror those exercised by opposite-sex couples as closely as the
circumstances would allow. 55 As a result, Maryland courts made available yet another institution of family law for homosexual relationships
that had previously only been available for heterosexuals. The Gestl
decision is yet another crucial step in the process of equalizing the
rights and protections bestowed upon same-sex and opposite-sex relationships in Maryland.
4.

Adoption by Homosexuals and Same-Sex Couples

At the outset, it should be noted that Maryland law does not expressly permit or deny the adoption of children by same-sex couples. 56
50. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66,68 ("[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in
the best interests of their children.").
51. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178,372 A.2d 582,587 (1977) ("When the
dispute is between a biological parent and a third party, it is presumed that
the child's best interest is subserved by custody in the parent.") (emphasis
added).
52. Gesti, 133 Md. App. at 244, 754 A.2d at 1102.
53. Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 222, 721 A.2d 662, 670-71 (1998) ("These
best interest factors also apply to visitation, as well as any other proceeding
where the best interest of the child is at issue.") (emphasis added). Earlier, the
court stated that a child's best interests are implicated in "visitation, custody, and adoption" proceedings. Id. at 219,721 A.2d at 669. The lack of
an announcement of a different test for custody or adoption by homosexuals implies that those actions would not be denied because of their sexual
orientation.
54. Gesti, 133 Md. App. at 243-44, 754 A.2d at 110l.
55. Since biological reality prevents a same-sex couple from producing mutually genetic children, the custody regime for gay couples established in Gesti
by extending a cause of action to a "non-biological parent who has had
joint custody of a child with the biological parent" is the closest equivalent
to the regime utilized by opposite-sex couples, who are capable of being
mutually biological parents. Id.
56. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-309(a) (LexisNexis 2004) ("Any adult may
petition a court to decree an adoption.") (repealed by the Permanency for
Families and Children Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws 2581 (to be reenacted as
FAM. LAw §§ 5-331 (b) (1) (adoption without prior termination of parental
rights), 5-345 (b) (1) (adoption after termination of parental rights), 5-3A29(a) (private adoption), 5-3B-13(b) (1) (independent adoption))).
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Rather, the statute uses broad and inclusive language,57 in contrast to
Florida's statute completely prohibiting such adoptions. 58 Though reported cases of same-sex couple adoptions are rare,59 evidence suggests that adoptions by same-sex couples are quite commonplace in
Maryland courts. 60 The most common form of adoption under this
broad, permissive scheme is the "second parent" adoption, which involves the adoption of one partner's natural child by the natural parent's same-sex partner without sacrificing the natural parent's
parental rights. 61 This form of adoption may occur as a result of a
number of varying circumstances, including the non-adoptive natural
parent's willful termination of their parental rights,62 or an imposed
termination of rights due to abuse, failing to maintain meaningful
contact with the child, or some other harm imposed on the child by
that parent. 63 While other adoptions result in the automatic termina57. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Moreover, the statute further provides that a court may not deny a petition for adoption because the petitioner is single or does not have a spouse, thus pre-empting courts from
denying same-sex couples, who cannot currently marry under Maryland
law, the ability to adopt. FAM. LAw § 5-309(b) (repealed by the Permanency
for Families and Children Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws 2581 (to be reenacted as FAM. LAw § 5-349(b) ("In ruling on a petition for adoption ... a
juvenile court may not deny a petition for adoption solely because the petitioner is single or unmarried."»).
58. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2005) ("No person eli&ible to adopt
under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual. '); see also Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.
2004) (affirming the constitutionality of the Florida statute), cm. denied,
125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). Until an amendment passed in 1999, New Hampshire also forbade same-sex adoptions. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4
(Supp. 1989) ("[AJny individual not a minor and not a homosexual may
adopt.").
59. See, e.g., In re Petition of D.L.G. & MAH., No. 95-179001/CAD, 2 MFLM
Supp. 21 (Cir. Ct. BaIt. City June 27, 1996). The D.L.G. decision was the
first reported case of a same-sex second parent adoption in Maryland. Judge
Approves Same-Sex Adoption Petition; Second Ever in Maryland, MD. FAM. L.
MONTHLY (The Daily Record, Baltimore, Md.), February 1997, at 16.
60. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 32, Deane v. Conaway (Civ. No. 24-C-04-005390) (Cir.
Ct. Balt. City June 14,2005) (on file with author); see also Ryiah Lilith, The
G.I.F. T. of Two Biological and Legal Mothers, 9 AM. U J. GENDER Soc. POL'y &
L. 207, 214 n.49 (2001); 25 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 1, 14 (Thomson West ed.,
2004).
6l. See Lilith, supra note 60, at 214 nn.47-48; see also 25 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 1,
supra note 60, at 9.
62. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-311 (b) (LexisNexis 2004) (repealed by the
Permanency for Families and Children Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws 2581)
(to be reenacted as FAM. LAw § 5-350(a) (when the non-adoptive parent's
rights have been terminated, adoption is allowed when the individual's
guardian only consents».
63. FAM. LAw § 5-313 (repealed by the Permanency for Families and Children
Act of 2005,2005 Md. Laws 2581 Ch 464) (to be reenacted as FAM. LAw § 53B-21 ("In ruling under this subsection, a court shall give primary consider-
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tion of a natural parent's parental rights,64 a statutory exception for
second parent adoptions preserves the adoptive natural parent's
rights. 65
Maryland's first reported case of a same-sex second parent adoption, In re Petition ofD.L. c. & M.A.H., 66 made two crucial findings with
respect to same-sex parent adoptions. First, Judge Friedman of the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City found that Maryland's adoption statute "does not prohibit adoption by same-sex partners,"67 a finding
supported in large measure by the analysis in North v. North. 68 Second,
the court extended the second parent adoption exception to the lesbian partners in D.L. C. in reliance upon similar extensions in other
states. 69 Ultimately, the court granted the adoption based on its finding that doing so was unquestionably in the best interests of the
couples' children. 70
Interestingly, Maryland law provides that once adopted, children in
same-sex partnership families are "entitled to all the rights and privileges of and [are] subject to all the obligations of children born to the
adoptive parents."71 Not only does this provision ensure the equal
rights and protection of adoptive children, but its language also signals something important about the expansiveness of the concept of

64.

65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

71.

ation to the health and safety of the prospective adoptee in detennining
the prospective adoptee's best interests.")).
FAM. LAw § 5-308 (b) (2) (repealed by the Permanency for Families and
Children Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws 2581) (to be reenacted as FAM. LAw
§§ 5-341 (a)(2)(ii) (adoption without prior tennination of parental rights),
5-352 (a) (2) (ii) (adoption with prior tennination of parental rights), 5-3A35(a)(2) (ii) (private adoption), 5-3B-24(a) (2) (ii) (independent
adoption) ).
FAM. LAw § 5-315 (repealed by the Permanency for Families and Children
Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws 2581) (to be reenacted as FAM. LAw §§ 5331 (b) (2) (adoption without prior termination of parental rights), 5345(b)(2) (adoption with prior termination of parental rights), 5-3A29(c)(l) (private adoption), 5-3B-13(b)(2) (independent adoption)).
No. 95-179001/CAD, 2 MFLM Supp. 21 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City June 27, 1996).
Id. at 22. The court also noted several studies supporting its finding that
"[t]here appears to be no substantiation for the view that homosexuals cannot properly raise children .... " Id. at 24.
Id. at 22. See supra Part II.A.l for a discussion of North.
Id. at 23-24 (recognizing that New Jersey, New York, and Colorado have
extended the second parent adoption exception to same-sex couples).
Id. at 24 ("The children are both happy and healthy; each consented without reservation to these adoptions . . . there have been no discern able ill
effects brought upon these children by the de facto family the petitioners
have created. The benefits of granting this adoption, on the other hand,
are overwhelming.").
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-308 (b) (1) (ii) (LexisNexis 2004) (repealed by
the Permanency for Families and Children Act of 2005, 2005 Md. Laws
2581) (to be reenacted as FAM. LAw §§ 5-341 (a)(2) (i) (adoption without
prior termination of parental rights), 5-352 (a) (2) (i) (adoption with prior
tennination of parental rights), 5-3A-35(a)(2)(i) (private adoption), 5-3B24(b)(l) (independent adoption)).
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family in Maryland law. By operation of this statute and the "wedlock"
language therein, the adoptive children of same-sex couples are
viewed in the same way as those of opposite-sex couples in the marital
sense.
Furthermore, the simple fact that same-sex couples are permitted to
adopt is another foundational aspect of the principle of sexual orientation equality that has developed in Maryland law. In courts around
the state, judges have decided time and again that two loving, caring,
and responsible same-sex partners are well-suited to raise a child. 72
The gravity and importance of granting an adoption petition submitted by a homosexual couple differs very little from the issuance of a
marriage license. Both actions cut to the heart of intimate familial
relations and serve as the foundations of our society as social human
beings: parenting and marriage. Quite often, in the view of Maryland
and federal courts, these concepts are inextricably intertwined. 73
How these fundamental rights could be divorced from each other
when they are sought to be exercised by homosexuals defies both
logic and fundamental fairness. 74

B.

The Incorporation of Sexual Orientation Equality into Maryland CriminalLaw

Much like the advancements in the family law context that provide
the foundation for the orientation-blind principle, the criminal laws
of Maryland have also evolved in a manner consonant with sexual orientation equality. Two developments in particular have reshaped Maryland criminal law: one, essentially de-criminalizing homosexual
sodomy and, the other, implying that the "battered spouse" defense is
available to an abused member of a same-sex relationship.
1.

The Decriminalization of Homosexual Sodomy

The sweeping language in the landmark Supreme Court case of
Lawrence v. Texas,75 which invalidated a sodomy statute that targeted
72. See supra notes 59-60.
73. See, e.g., In reYve S., 373 Md. 551, 565-66, 819 A.2d 1030, 1038-39 (2003)
(quoting Wolinksi v. Browneller, 115 Md. App. 285, 297-98, 693 A.2d 30, 3536 (1997) ("Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska . .. and Pierce v. Society of Sisters ... , the Supreme Court, in a variety of contexts, has recognized that
freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.") (citations omitted)). The Wolinski opinion quoted by YveS.
also noted that the Maryland Declaration of Rights contemplates those
same rights conceived under the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolinksi, 115
Md. App. at 298 n.6, 693 A.2d at 35.
74. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
75. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). \
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consensual homosexual activity and overturned Bowers v. Hardwick,16
has only solidified that which had already been achieved in Maryland
four years earlier. In January 1999, a consent decree signed by the
Maryland Attorney General's Office 77 rendered the state's sodomy
statute 78 dead letter law just one year after the law's constitutionality
had been challenged. 79 In that challenge, a Maryland circuit court
extended the ruling in the case of Schochet v. State,80 which excluded
private heterosexual activity from the scope of the sodomy statute, to
also exclude private homosexual activity.81 This extended ruling thus
avoided the equal protection violation created by Schochet's unequal
application of the law. 82
The advent of Lawrence and its implied overturning of Schochet,83
Maryland's closest analog to Bowers v. Hardwick,84 simply punctuates
Maryland's policy of abolishing discriminatory laws affecting homosexuals. In that regard, the fact that Maryland's consent decree eliminating its sodomy law predates Lawrence by four years is a measure of
the state's dedication to sexual orientation equality. To be sure, the
decriminalization of the uniquely private and consensual sexual activity of same-sex relationships is a cornerstone in the argument of equality between the different sexual orientations. Once again, Maryland
law embodies the principle of equality by placing same-sex and opposite-sex relationships on the same legal footing.

2.

The "Battered
Relationshi ps

Spouse

Syndrome"

Defense

in

Same-Sex

An intriguing case decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
March, 2004 that considered the scope of the "Battered Spouse Syndrome" offers yet more evidence that same-sex relationships are regarded as equally worthy of the protections of the law. In State v.
76. 478 U.S. 186, 191, 196 (1986) (holding that there is no fundamental right
to engage in homosexual sodomy and affirming the constitutionality of
state laws making such conduct illegal).
77. See Scott Calvert, Ruling on Gays Stirs Up Emotions, BALT. SUN,june 28, 2003,
at lA.
78. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 3-321 (LexisNexis 2002).
79. See Williams v. Glendening, No. 98036031/CL-I059, 1998 WL 965992 (Md.
Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1998).
80. 320 Md. 714, 717, 580 A.2d 176, 177 (1990).
8l. Williams, 1998 WL 965992, at *7.
82. [d. ("It cannot be doubted ... that there would be an equal protection
violation if acts, considered not criminal when committed by a heterosexual
couple, could be prosecuted when practiced by a homosexual couple.
There is simply no basis for the distinction.").
83. 320 Md. at 717, 580 A.2d at 177 (holding that the statute forbidding "unnatural or perverted sexual practices" does not encompass "consensual,
noncommercial, heterosexual activity between adults in the privacy of the
home," while leaving homosexual acts open to criminal prosecution).
84. See supra note 76.
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Smullen,8e. the court, in bringing the assertions of battered children
within the ambit of the statutory Battered Spouse Syndrome 86 self-defense theory,87 pondered the scope of the defense with respect to
same-sex relationships.88 Recognizing that defense theories like these
are subject to expansion 89 the Smullen court's dicta implied that the
defense would be extended to same-sex relationships as an eligible
type of "adult domestic relationship. "90 The court emphasized that
"[a]lthough the bill [codifying the defense] used the terminology
'battered spouse syndrome,' it made clear that it was applicable as well
to former spouses, cohabitants, and former cohabitants .... "91
The dicta of Smullen, then, implies that the defense is applicable to
homosexuals for the same reasons that it applies to their heterosexual
counterparts. First, such broad and sweeping terminology contemplates the inclusion of same-sex couples just as surely as it does other
cohabitating couples of other sexual orientations. Moreover, homosexuals are abused by their same-sex partners and with the same frequency as members of opposite-sex relationships.92 Thus, the
battered spouse syndrome is equally applicable to same-sex couples in
the same way that the Smullen Court found that it applies to battered
children: "[t]he underpinnings of that application, we believe, have
been generally accepted in the psychological and legal communities
and are therefore reliable."93 Those underpinnings are satisfied being that the incidence of abuse in relationships of both orientations
and the underlying causes of that abuse are, sadly, universally true. 94
C.

The Proliferation of Anti-Discrimination Measures Targeting Sexual Orientation-Based Prejudice

Another context in which homosexuals have achieved an important
measure of equality with heterosexuals in Maryland is in the context
of protection from discrimination. Positive developments in this
85. 380 Md. 233,844 A.2d 429 (2004).
86. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-916 (LexisNexis 2002).
87. 380 Md. at 268, 844 A.2d at 449 ("[W]e do hold that the battered spouse
syndrome, as recognized in § 10-916, applies as well to battered children.").
88. Id. at 258, 844 A.2d at 443 ("[Q]uestions arose whether the [battered
spouse] syndrome was limited to wives trapped in a marital relationship
with their abuser or included ... same-sex persons involved in a homosexual communal relationship .... ").
89. Id.
90. Id. at 260, 844 A.2d at 444.
91. Id. at 259, 844 A.2d at 444 (emphasis in original).
92. Nancy E. Murphy, Queer justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic
Violence, 30 VAL. U. L. REv. 335, 340 & n.34 (1995) (citing CLAIRE M.
RENZETTI, VIOLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN RELATIONSHIPS 18
(Sage Publications 1992) (reporting that abuse occurs in about 25 to 30
percent of both same-sex and opposite-sex relationships».
93. Smullen, 380 Md. at 268, 844 A.2d at 449-50.
94. Murphy, supra note 92, at 340 & n.36.
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realm of the law are indicative of a design to equalize the once-unprotected group with the rest of society in the eyes of the law. Indeed, the
fundamental purpose of any anti-discrimination measure is to eliminate disparate treatment between distinct segments of the population
and the prejudices animating such treatment, thereby creating equality amongst all members of society.95 The magnitude of the measures
currently in force in Maryland is, indeed, astounding. Certainly, the
proceeding anti-discrimination laws and regulations buttress the legal
equality of homosexuals in Maryland.

l.

The Antidiscrimination Act of 2001

One ground-breaking law passed just four years ago, the Antidiscrimination Act of 2001,96 added Maryland to the list of just eleven
states and the District of Columbia that have placed a statewide ban
on discrimination based on sexual orientation. 97 The law prohibits
discrimination in employment,98 housing,99 and public accommodations lOO based on one's particular real or perceived sexual orientation,
whatever it may be. 101
Although the Act contains a proviso that disclaims any interpretation of the law as "authoriz[ing] or validat[ing]" same-sex marriage, 102
it is still a critical step forward in the evolution of orientation-blind law
in Maryland. Indeed, the Act's stated purpose and effect is to repudiate disparate treatment based on sexual orientation. 103 Interestingly,
the Act makes no distinction as to homosexuality or heterosexuality in
its effect, providing equal protection to all sexual orientations,104 thus
providing protection on an orientation-blind basis. As a result, Maryland law once again embodies the principle of orientation equality by
cloaking both orientations with the same rights and protections
against discrimination.

95. See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 13 (2000).
96. 2001 Md. Laws 2112.
97. Catherine M. Brennan, Banning Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation,
35 MD. B. J., May:June 2002 at 50, 51 (2002).
98. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(a)(I) (2003).
99. Id. § 22(a) (1).
100. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5(b) (Supp. 2004).
101. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5(a) (Supp. 2004); id. §§ 15(j), 20(u) (2003)
('" [S]exual orientation' means the identification of an individual as to male
or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality.").
102. 2001 Md. Laws 2122.
103. [d. at 2112 ("F[or] the purpose of prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation .... ").
104. See supra notes 98-101.
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Other Statutory and Regulatory Measures Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination

Maryland law also prohibits sexual orientation discrimination by
those employed in various professional vocations, including that of social workers 105 and judges. 106 What is more, as early as 1973, it was
held that the mere homosexuality of an educational professional was
not sufficient to either fail to hire,107 transfer or terminate I08 that person. There is also a statute tailored to outlaw discrimination in collective bargaining labor relations for the Maryland-National Capital Park
and Planning Commission,109 as well as two statutes prohibiting discrimination in the operations of the Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission. 11 0
There are also a great deal of regulations in force in Maryland that
further the goal of equality between the sexual orientations in the
state. The m.yority of these regulations propagate the state's anti-discrimination policies in employment and other matters under state
control. III
lOS. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH ace. § 19-311 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004).
106. MD. R. 16-813 Canon 3 (LexisNexis Supp. 200S) ("A judge shall perform
the duties of judicial office ... impartially, and without having or manifesting bias or prejudice, including bias or prejudice based on . . . sexual
orientation .... ").
107. Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 3S9 F. Supp. 843, 8S3 (D. Md. 1973) ("[T]he
Board of Education's policy of not knowingly employing any homosexuals
is objectionable."), affd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
108. Id. at 8S6 ("[M]ere knowledge that a teacher is homosexual is not sufficient
to justify transfer or dismissal.").
109. MD. ANN. CODE art. 28, § 2-112.1(f) (l)-(2) (2003).
110. MD. ANN. CODE art. 29, § 1-107 (2003) (prohibiting discrimination by the
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC»; id. § 3-102(h) (requiring that contracts awarded by the WSSC must include terms requiring
the contractor "[n]ot to discriminate in any manner against an employee
or applicant for employment on the basis of ... sexual orientation").
Ill. MD. CODE REGS. 01.01.199S.19(I) (A) (11) (2004) (executive order to establish an equal employment opportunity program for state government to
ensure personnel actions taken "without regard to ... [s]exual orientation"); id. 01.04.04.04(B) (7) (2004) (requiring the board of directors of
Residential Child Care Programs to ensure that such programs do not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation); id. OS.04.11.18(A) (200S)
(prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by sponsors or contractors
in the Special Housing Opportunities Program); id. OS.OS.02.14(A) (200S)
(prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in the Multi-Family Housing
Revenue Bond Financing Program); id. OS.17.01.1O(A) (200S) (prohibiting
sexual orientation discrimination by sponsors in the Community Legacy
Program); id. 07.03.03.07 (I) (9) (b) (2004) (deeming quitting a job because
of sexual orientation discrimination as good cause for purposes of the Family Investment Program); id. 07.03.08.02(B) (1) (h) (2004) (same in Emergency Assistance to Families with Children program); id. 07.03.16.08(D) (2)
(2004) (same in Refugee Cash Assistance program); id. 07.0S.03.09(A) (2)
(2004) (prohibiting private child placement agencies from denying an application because of the applicant's or the adoptive child's sexual orientation); id. 07.0S.03.1S(C) (2) (2004) (prohibiting the delay or denial of the
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Anti-Discrimination Measures in Individual Maryland Counties

In addition to the state-wide protections created by the Antidiscrimination Act and other measures, some individual Maryland counties have passed ordinances prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination in a plentitude of its other manifestations. At present,
five of Maryland's twenty-three counties and Baltimore City have their

placement of an adoptive child because of the adoptive parent or child's
sexual orientation); id. 1O.1B.06.03(A) (6) (2004) (requiring Maryland
AIDS Drug Assistance Program providers to provide services without regard
to sexual orientation); id. 1O.26.03.03(D)(5) (2004) (prohibiting licensees
of the Board of Acupuncture from discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation); id. 10.34.1O.06(A)(1) (2004) (prohibiting pharmacists from
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.41.02.04(E) (2005)
(prohibiting licensees of the Board of Examiners for Audiologists, Hearing
Aid Dispensers, and Speech-Language Pathologists from discriminating on
the basis of sexual orientation); id. 1O.42.03.03(B)(5) (2005) (prohibiting
licensed social workers from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 1O.43.14.03(D) (5) (2005) (prohibiting licensed chiropractors and
registered chiropractic assistants of the Board of Chiropractic Examiners
from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id.
1O.43.18.03(D) (5) (2005) (prohibiting licensed massage therapists of the
Board of Chiropractic Examiners from discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation); id. 10.46.02.01 (A) (l) (2005) (prohibiting licensees of the
Board of Occupational Therapy Practice from discriminating on the basis
of sexual orientation); id. 1O.47.01.07(C) (2005) (prohibiting a program
administered under the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.51.04.01 (C) (2) (x)
(2005) (prohibiting providers of Maryland PrimaryCare from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.53.01.01 (D)(5) (2005)
(prohibiting an electrologist from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 10.5B.03.05(A) (2)(b) (2005) (prohibiting a counselor or
therapist certified or licensed by the Board of Professional Counselors and
Therapists from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation); id.
1l.02 .04.02 (A) (2005) (mandating that departmen tal actions of the Department of Transportation not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation); id. 11.07.06.13 (2005) (mandating that proposals submitted to the
Transportation Public-Private Partnership Program may not be subjected to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); id. l1.15.29.02(E)(6)
(2005) (permitting the rejection of motor vehicle registration plates which
"[c]ommunicates a message of any kind about" sexual orientation); id.
13A.01.04.03 (2005) (guaranteeing a safe, adequate, and harassment-free
educational environment for students without regard to sexual orientation
in Maryland's public schools); id. 14.27.02.03(B) (2004) (calling for the
implementation of an equal employment opportunity program in the Maryland Environmental Service to administer the human resources policies
and provisions without discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation);
id. 14.29.04.09(C) (1) (2004) (prohibiting borrowers from the Maryland
Heritage Areas Loan Program from discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation); id. 14.30.04.04(B)(3) (e) (i) (2004) (requiring election petitions of employee organizations for the State Higher Education Labor Relations Board to certifY that they accept members without regard to sexual
orientation); 27:23 Md. Reg. 2130 (Nov. 17, 2000) (executive order for
commission to study sexual orientation discrimination in Maryland).
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own local ordinances banning discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 112
Like the Antidiscrimination Act, these ordinances apply equally to
both homosexuals and heterosexuals. Given the basic level of protection afforded by the Antidiscrimination Act, these county ordinances
provide an additional barrier to sexual orientation prejudice that is
both practical and symbolic in effect. Furthermore, they illustrate the
pervasiveness of the orientation-blind principle in Maryland state and
local law.
For example, Howard County has enacted a panoply of anti-discrimination measures focusing on sexual orientation both generally l13 and
in specific contexts including housing, employment, service by law enforcement, public accommodations, finance, and use of "open
spaces"Y4 Prince George's County has similarly extended protections
against discrimination based on sexual orientation in a variety of similar contexts as well as real estate and contractingY5 Baltimore City
has also made efforts to ensure the equality of homosexuals with various anti-discrimination measures concerning sexual orientation including medical services and a program that tracks sexual orientationmotivated hate crimesY6 Caroline County has passed an equal opportunity employment resolution that bans any discrimination against
potential employees on the basis of sexual orientation. 117 Lastly,
Anne Arundel County has mandated that no sexual orientation discrimination is to be permitted by cable franchisees. 118
Perhaps some of the most far-reaching and innovative of these local
ordinances can be found in Montgomery County, which has enacted
measures banning sexual orientation discrimination generally,119
112. See infra notes 113-21.
113. HOWARD COUNTY, MD., CODE § 12.200 (1998) (prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation generally).
114. [d. § 12.207 (housing discrimination); id. § 12.208 (employment discrimination); id. § 12.209 (discrimination by law enforcement personnel); id.
§ 12.210 (public accommodation discrimination); id. § 12.211 (financing
discrimination); id. § 19.513 (discrimination in use of "open space areas").
115. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE § 2-210 (2002) (housing discrimination); id. § 2-231.01 (commercial real estate discrimination); id. § 5A-ll7
(cable franchise discrimination); id. § 10A-122 (contracting discrimination); id. § 16-101 (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation
generally) .
116. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 4 § 3-1 (2004) (prohibiting employment
discrimination); id. § 3-2 (prohibiting public accommodations discrimination); id. § 3-3 (prohibiting education discrimination); id. § 3-4 (prohibiting health and welfare agency discrimination); id. § 3-5 (prohibiting
housing discrimination); id. art. 5, § 31-3 (providing for an annual review
of licensed medical service providers to certify that they do not deny service
on the basis of sexual orientation); id. art. 19, § 23-2 (providing for the
tracking of hate crimes motivated by the victim's sexual orientation).
117. CAROLINE COUNTY, MD., CODE app. II, Res. No. 93-008, § 1 (A) (2003).
118. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD., CODE art. 13, § 2-811 (2004).
119. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 27-1 (2004).
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along with many specific prohibitions similar to those established in
other counties. 120 The County's most pioneering provision, however,
is its extension of various rights and privileges to homosexual couples
which were previously only enjoyed by heterosexual couples through
the civil contract of marriage. 121 The ordinances affecting this
change, therefore, have considerable bearing on the argument for the
equal enjoyment of the rights appurtenant to marriage by same-sex
couples to be explored in the proceeding section.
D.

Montgomery County's Extension of Marriage-Like Benefits to Same-Sex
Domestic Partnerships

Perhaps the most profound development in the evolution of Maryland's sexual orientation-blind legal system that buttresses the argument for same-sex marriage rights is Montgomery County's extension
of employment benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of County
employees. 122 The Maryland Court of Appeals' unanimous vindication of the ordinance in litigation challenging its constitutionalityl23
not only affirmed the emerging principle of orientation equality, but
also signaled its stance on some important issues that may come to
bear in Maryland's pending same-sex marriage lawsuit. 124
In Tyma v. Montgomery County, the court upheld the local ordinance
granting domestic partnership benefits as a proper exercise of the
powers delegated to the counties by the "Home Rule Amendment" to
the Maryland Constitution. 125 In order to reach this decision, the
court had to closely analyze the ordinance's purpose and effect to ensure that the county had not enacted a local law having an unduly
120. Id. § 8A-15 (prohibiting cable franchise discrimination); id. § 27-11
(prohibiting public accommodations discrimination); id. § 27-12 (prohibiting housing discrimination); id. § 27-16 (prohibiting commercial real estate
discrimination); id. § 27-19 (prohibiting employment discrimination); id.
§ 27-22 (prohibiting discrimination through intimidation); id. app. D,
§ 6.19 (prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination by licensees granted
licenses by Board of Licensing Commission); see also Montgomery County
Code of Regulations § 21.02.18.04 (2004) (prohibiting discrimination by
fire rescue personnel); id. § 27.26.01.01 (including crimes committed
against a person because of their sexual orientation as "hate crimes"); id.
§ 33.07.01.05 (prohibiting employment discrimination in county
operations) .
121. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 33-22 (2004) (providing certain insurance and financial benefits to same-sex domestic partnerships); id. § 52-24
(extending tax exemption for property transfers to same-sex couples).
122. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
123. Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 801 A.2d 148 (2002).
124. Deane v. Conaway, No. 24-C-04-005390 (Cir. Ct. BaIt. City filed July 7,
2004); see also text accompanying notes 136-37.
125. Tyma, 369 Md. at 518,801 A.2d at 160 ("[W]e hold that a home rule county
that provides benefits to the domestic partners of its employees does not
exceed its local lawmaking authority or otherwise undermine State and federal law.").
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general effect throughout the state. 126 The court's inquiry indicated
that the ordinance was, in fact, a local law and that the county had not
exceeded its home rule power. 127 The court's analysis also focused on
the ordinance's controversial effect in extending marriage-like benefits to same-sex couples. 128
In fact, the petitioners bringing the challenge in Tyma argued that
the county ordinance was "an attempt to legitimize illegitimate relationships under Maryland law by attempting to create, in the guise of
a benefits ordinance, a legal equivalency between lawful spouses and
same-sex domestic partners."129 This characterization of the law was
explicitly rejected by the court, which found that the law functioned
only to extend similar benefits to domestic partners. 130
The ordinance, titled the Employee Benefits Equity Act of 1999, was
enacted pursuant to the county's "long-standing policy, in law and
practice, against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation."131 In addition, the passage of the ordinance was motivated by
the sense that "it is unfair to treat employees differently based solely
on whether the employee's partner is legally recognized as a
spouse."132 This rationale is essentially a recapitulation of the foundational principles of the orientation-blind legal system. 133 The county
recognized that it had developed a well-founded policy of preventing
sexual orientation discrimination and created an affirmative benefit
for same-sex partners to equalize them with their opposite-sex counterparts. 134 This same extension of benefits should extend to samesex couples throughout the state based on the concept of fundamental fairness implicit in the sexual orientation-blind principle.
Although the court's decision that the ordinance did not implicate
the state's marriage laws 135 did not give it the occasion to pass upon
the constitutionality of Maryland's limitation of marriage to opposite126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

[d. at
[d. at
[d. at
[d. at
[d. at
[d. at

507-08, 801 A.2d at 153-54.
511, 801 A.2d at 156.
512, 514, 801 A.2d at 157-58.
509, 801 A.2d at 155.
514,801 A.2d at 158.
501, 801 A.2d at 150.

[d.
See supra text accompanying note 12 for a discussion of the principles of
the orientation-blind system.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32; see also MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
MD., CODE § 33-22(a) (2004).
135. Tyma, 369 Md. at 514,801 A.2d at 158 ("Nothing in the Act purports to, or
can be construed to, create an alternate form of marriage, authorize common law marriage or create any legal relationship. Nor does the Act, by its
terms or implication, restrict, modify or alter any rights incident to a marriage recognized in this State . . . . "). The court, in neutral terms, noted
earlier in the opinion that the county ordinance "does not infringe upon
the Legislature's ability to regulate marriage on a statewide basis," without
articulating whether the current regulation of marriage is constitutionally
valid. [d. at 511, 801 A.2d at 156.
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sex couples, Tyma was an important step forward. The decision upheld a county-level scheme that created a legal institution for same-sex
relationships much closer to marriage than anything currently available under Maryland law. In that regard, the ordinance limits eligibility for domestic partnership to same-sex couples who, inter alia, "share
a close personal relationship and [are] responsible for each other's
welfare" and have shared the same legal residence for at least one
year. I36 Indeed, the court recognized that" [t] 0 be sure, in the Act,
the requirements for domestic partnership generally parallel those for
marriage. "137
And so, ultimately, the court recognized that the extension of benefits to same-sex domestic partnerships was a valid exercise of the
county's authority to provide for the general welfare of its citizens. I38
This rationale would be particularly useful in application to the samesex marriage lawsuit currently being litigated in Maryland. Far from
protecting the general welfare of the state, denying same-sex couples
critical legal benefits I39 continues to significantly hinder their
136. Id. at 502 n.4, 801 A.2d at 151 n.4 (citing MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE
§ 32-22(c) (l)(A)-(C) (2004)).
137. Id. at 514, 801 A.2d at 158. In fact, the qualifications for a domestic partnership under the ordinance appear to be even more stringent than those
for marriage in the state. Compare MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 3222(c) (2004) (requiring, inter alia, partners to have shared a residence for
one year and to "share sufficient financial and legal obligations"), with MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 2-201, 2-202, 2-301 (LexisNexis 2004) (requiring
only that spouses be of the opposite sex, not be related by certain degrees
of affinity or consanguinity, and be a certain age).
138. Tyma, 369 Md. at 511, 801 A.2d at 156 ("Article 25A, § 5(S) of the Maryland
Code, which implements [the Home Rule Amendment], authorizes counties
. . . to enact 'such ordinances as may be expedient in maintaining the
peace, good government, health and welfare of the county' that 'are not
provided for by the public general law."').
139. In 1997, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported that federal
law provided at least 1,049 benefits appurtenant to marriage. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, GAO/OGC-97-16 at 1-2
(1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf. The
GAO upgraded that figure to 1,138 with the release of a new study in 2004.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, GAO/OGC-04353R at 1 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf.
In Maryland, there are at least 339 benefits and obligations associated with
marriage as codified in the Maryland Code according to the ACLU's pleadings in the Deane marriage equality case. Appendix to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment,
Deane v. Conaway (Civ. No. 24-C-04-005390) (Cir. Ct. Bait. City June 14,
2005) (on file with author); see infra Appendix. The more than 300 provisions run the gamut of important financial, medical, familial, and personal
matters. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 9-105, 9-106 (LexisNexis 2002) (establishes the marital communication and testimonial privileges); EST. & TRUSTS § 3-102 (LexisNexis 2001) (assigns the spouse of a
decedent first priority in intestate succession); FAM. LAw §§ 7-102, 7-103
(LexisNexis 2004) (creates a cause of action for both limited and absolute
divorce); id. §§ 8-203, 8-204, 8-205 (allows a court to determine the existence and value of marital property and grant a monetary award); id. §§ 11-
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welfare. 140

III.

THE MARRIAGE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE
"ORIENTATION-BLIND" PRINCIPLE

The preceding Part has discussed, at some length, the gradual and
expansive evolution of sexual orientation blindness as a principle of
Maryland law. This principle establishes that many crucial rights and
privileges that were, at one time, only understood to protect or apply
to heterosexuals or opposite-sex relationships are now extended
equally to homosexuals and same-sex relationships.141 It is in the
realm of substantive due process analysis, however, that the orientation-blind principle becomes legally actionable. In that analysis, the
principle guides the court's descriptive and historical inquiries into
fundamental rights,142 instructing that such rights should be conceived without regard to sexual orientation. Of course, the fundamental substantive due process right at issue here is that of
marriage,143 particularly marriage between same-s~x partners.

A.

Maryland Substantive Due Process

In Maryland, substantive due process is enshrined in Article 24 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 144 which is read in the same man-

140.

141.
142.
143.

144.

101, 11-106 (provides a cause of action for both definite and indefinite alimony); HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (a) (2) (ii) (LexisNexis 2005) (allows a patient's spouse to make decisions about health care for an incapacitated
spouse who has not elected a health care agent); INS. § 15-201 (c)(2) (ii)
(LexisNexis 2002) (permits a spouse to add another spouse to an insurance
policy on the application of either spouse); REAL PROP. § 4-108 (LexisNexis
2003) (allows husband and wife to hold property as tenants by the entireties and avoid straw deeds when transferring such property to another type
of estate); TAX-GEN. § 7-203 (b) (2) (iii) (LexisNexis 2004) (creates the
spousal exemption from the inheritance tax); id. § lO-807 (requires a married couple who filed a joint federal income tax return to also file a joint
Maryland income tax return). The full list of benefits and obligations is
appended to this Comment.
The detrimental effects of these myriad withheld benefits on same-sex
couple families in Maryland are as diverse as the couples themselves. See,
e.g., Stephanie Shapiro, Making a Case for Marriage, BALT. SUN,Jan. 23, 2005,
at 6E; Susan Kinzie, Fighting for a Married Life Together in Md., WASH. POST,
July 18, 2004, at T03.
See supra Part II.
See infra Part IIlAl.
Dep't of Human Res. v. Thompson, 103 Md. App. 175, 197, 652 A.2d 1183,
1193 (1995) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972»
("Fundamental liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the
c~:mstitution include 'n<;>~ merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
rIght ... to marry. . .. ).
MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 24 (2002) ("That no man ought to be taken or
imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed,
or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or
property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.").
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ner as the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 145 Maryland's Due Process Clause, though, is still capable of producing,146 and should produce, results different than
those possible under the federal Constitution. 147 It has been recognized in Maryland that these different results may be more expansive
in their bestowal of rights in cases where fundamental fairness dictates
such a result. 148 On several occasions, the Court of Appeals has given
an expanded reading of Article 24 compared to the federal Constitution. 149 The broader result suggested here is that Maryland substantive due process should be guided by the sexual orientation equality
principle explored above, thus requiring the recognition of same-sex
marriage under the state constitution even though such recognition
has not yet been achieved under the federal Constitution. 150
1.

Tailoring Substantive Due Process Analysis to Maryland Law

The seminal case of Washington v. Glucksberg,151 provides that assertions of substantive due process rights are subjected to a two-pronged
analysis that first requires a "'careful description' of the asserted fun145. Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 77, 775 A.2d 1218, 1224
(2001) .
146. Aero Motors, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 274 Md. 567, 587, 337 A.2d
685, 699 (1975) ("Although Art. [24] of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
has long 'been equated' with the 'due process' clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by judicial construction and application, the two provisions
are not synonymous.").
147. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977):
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federallaw to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent
protective force of state law-for without it, the full realization of
our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
See also Att'y Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 705 n.9, 426 A.2d 929, 941
n.9 (1981).
148. Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91,175,786 A.2d 631, 681 (2001) (Raker,].,
dissenting) ("Although this Court has generally interpreted Article 24 in
pari materia with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we
have interpreted it more broadly in instances where fundamental fairness
demanded that we do so.").
149. See id. (citing examples in the criminal context such as placing stricter limits on prosecutorial discretion to enter nolle prosequi and the optional
merger of criminal offenses). Maryland's due process clause has also been
read more broadly than the federal constitution in granting the right to
counsel. See Das v. Das, 133 Md. App. 1,28,754 A.2d 441, 456 (2000) (citing Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 358, 363, 464 A.2d 228, 234,
237 (1983)).
150. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
151. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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damentalliberty interest."152 The second prong of the Glucksberganalysis prescribes a demonstration that the carefully described asserted
right is "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. "'153
While federal jurisprudence supplies the prevailing test for the examination of asserted substantive due process rights,154 the history, laws,
and social climate of a particular state should color the application of
Glucksberg in matters of state substantive due process rights. 155
The analytical framework announced in Glucksberg has been
adopted in Maryland l56 and is, therefore, appropriate to apply for the
assertion of same-sex marriage rights under Maryland law. As discussed above, though, the Glucksberg analysis should be tailored precisely to the history and law of the jurisdiction where it is being
applied to ensure that the result is true to that jurisdiction's particular
circumstances. 157 This tailoring should be done here and is only logical since Maryland constitutional law should be governed by Maryland's specific history and jurisprudence just as federal constitutional
law is governed by national history and jurisprudence. 158

2.

Maryland's Orientation-Blind System and the Careful Description
of Same-Sex Marriage Rights

The extensive development of sexual orientation equality in Maryland's decisional, statutory, and regulatory law greatly informs the
"careful description" prong of the Glucksberg analysis. The litany of
privileges and protections now equally available to homosexuals and
heterosexuals in Maryland 159 suggests that the conception of any legal
right in the state should be described without regard to sexual orientation. This is also the case with the careful description of the marriage rights invoked by individuals that are part of a same-sex
relationship. Just as one's protection from employment discrimina152.
153.
154.
155.

156.
157.

158.
159.

Id. at 720-21 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
Id. (citations omitted).
See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
See Deems v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 101, 231 A.2d 514, 517 (1967); see
generally Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National Lessons
From Vermont's State Constitutional Case on Marriage oj Same-Sex Couples, 43
B.C. L. REv. 73 (2001).
Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md. App. 483, 537, 763 A.2d 209, 238 (2000).
See, e.g., Standhardt v. Super. Ct. ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451,
459 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that "same-sex marriages are neither
deeply rooted in the legal and social history of our Nation or state') (emphasis added); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 977
(Mass. 2003) (Spina,]., dissenting) ("In this Commonwealth and in this country, the roots of the institution of marriage are deeply set in history as a civil
union between a single man and a single woman.") (emphasis added).
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-2l.
See supra Part II.
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tion/ 60 enjoyment of child visitation rights,161 or invocation of the
"battered spouse syndrome" defense 162 is no longer dependent on
one's orientation, one's enjoyment of the benefits and protections of
civil marriage should no longer be predicated on one's orientation.
In fact, the orientation-blind principle would suggest a description of
same-sex marriage that is precisely the same as the description of opposite-sex marriage: the right to marry the person of your choice. 163
Logically, this conception reflects common sense as well as legal
reasoning and is universally applicable to other fundamental rights.
One would not carefully describe a gay man or lesbian's free speech
rights as the "right to homosexual free speech." Such a formulation is
inapposite since we do not conceive of that right in terms of sexual
orientation because it is immaterial to its exercise. In the same way,
Maryland law has been removing sexual orientation from the conception of legal rights with increasing scope under the rationale that orientation has no bearing on those rights. 164
Indeed, to carefully describe the marriage rights of same-sex
couples as separate and distinct from the rights of opposite-sex
couples would be to make the same kind of misapprehension made by
the United States Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick165 concerning
the rights of homosexuals.1 66 Just seventeen years after Bowers, the
Court rectified this misapprehension in Lawrence v. Texas. 167 There,
the Court indicated that Bowers was wrong when it was decided and
that the Court had "misapprehended the claim of liberty there
presented to it."168 To be sure, the claim of liberty to marry asserted
by homosexuals is not a new or separate right, but is rather an exercise of the choice contemplated by the privacy of marital decisions. 169

3.

Marital Choice and the History Prong of Substantive Due Process
Analysis

Certainly, it has been well-established in constitutional jurisprudence that the right to marriage is not only deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition,170 but that it is also firmly regarded as a
160.
16I.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See supra note 98.
See supra Part ILA.l.
See supra Part 1I.B.2.
See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
ld. at 190 ("The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy .... ").
539 U.S. 558 (2003). See also supra Part II.B.I.
ld. at 567. The Lawrence majority further noted that the Bowers Court's formulation of the issue in that case "disclose[d] the Court's own failure to
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake." ld.
See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)) ("The freedom to marry has long been recog-
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fundamental right. 171 If this fundamental right to marry means anything, it must mean that one has the right to choose the person he or
she truly desires to marry, including someone of the same sex, lest it
lose its quality as a right. I72 The Court has reiterated this right and
"long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Arnendment."173
Maryland's current statutory scheme necessarily abridges this personal choice aspect of marriage for homosexuals wishing to marry
their same-sex partner. Although homosexuals are permitted to
marry, they may only do so provided they marry a person of the opposite sex. 174 This Hobson's choice frustrates the natural dynamic of
intimate relationships and the essence of the freedom of choice.
Under this scheme, the personal preferences of homosexuals are
wrongfully disregarded and subjugated in favor of an exclusively heterosexual paradigm. 175
To illustrate, imagine that the status quo was reversed and the Maryland statute permitted only same-sex marriage. Because the statute automatically eliminates the possibility of an opposite-sex spouse, the
inclination of a heterosexual man to marry a woman would be stifled.
This scheme, like the current one in Maryland, unfairly establishes a
conception of the right to marry in terms of orientation, which in
practicality ignores a significant portion of the population'S natural
preferences. I 76
A similar problem was encountered almost forty years ago with respect to race in Loving v. Virginia. I77 There, the Court invalidated Vir-

17l.
172.

173.
174.
175.
176.

177.

nized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.").
Id. at 383-85 (reciting the history of marriage's place as a fundamental right
and the protections appurtenan t thereto); see also In re Matthew R., 113 Md.
App. 701, 721, 688 A.2d 955, 964 (1997).
Cf Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by
the State.").
Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 385 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414
U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 2-201 (LexisNexis 2004).
See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD,
BREAD, AND POETRY: SELECTED PROSE 1979-1985, at 23 (W. W. Norton 1986)
(1980).
Simon LeVay & Dean H. Hamer, Evidence for a Biological Influence in Male
Homosexuality, in THE SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN BOOK OF THE BRAIN 171 (The
Lyons Press 1999); see also Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkampj, or,
How America Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romer v. Evans
Didn't, 49 DUKE LJ. 1559, 1568 n.43 (2000) (noting that "ten percent is the
figure frequently cited as the percentage of homosexual men in the U.S.
population .... ").
388 U.S. at 1.
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ginia's miscegenation statute motivated by an unconstitutional racist
paradigm of white supremacy.178 Just as the Equal Protection Clause
of the Federal Constitution was offended by a restriction of marriage
rights based upon race in Loving, 179 so too is Maryland's Equal Protection Clause 180 violated by the limitation of marriage rights based on
sexual orientation in light of the orientation-blind principle. 181
The decision of two gay men or lesbians to marry one another is
conceptually no different from that of Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving's interracial marriage. 182 In fact, their similarities are notably instructive. At the time the Lovings were married in another
jurisdiction, interracial marriage was far from being "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition" as Glucksberg requires today.183 Indeed, the Court observed that Virginia was one of sixteen states
prohibiting interracial marriages l84 and the lower state court's opinion explaining the Loving's conviction cited an established history
178. Id. at 11-12.
179. Id. at 12 ("There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry
solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause.").
180. Verzi v. Baltimore County, 333 Md. 411, 417, 635 A.2d 967, 970 (1994)
("[Ilt is well established that Article 24 [of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights] embodies the same equal protection concepts found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."). Like the Due Process
Clause of the Declaration of Rights, Maryland's equal protection doctrine is
capable of divergent interpretation from the federal provision. Id. ("We
have consistently recognized that the federal Equal Protection Clause and
the Article 24 guarantee of equal protection of the laws are complementary
but independent, and 'a discriminatory classification may be an unconstitutional breach of the equal protection doctrine under the authority of Article 24 alone.''') (quoting Att'y Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 715, 426 A.2d
929,947 (1981)). Again, like the due process clause, the equal protection
ensured by "Article 24 acts to vindicate important personal rights protected
by the Maryland Constitution or those recognized as vital to the history and
traditions of the people of this State." Waldron, 289 Md. at 715, 426 A.2d at
947. The sexual orientation-blind legal principle that has bestowed so
many legal rights to homosexuals in the state has become one of those such
traditions.
181. Although a popular argument in favor of same-sex marriage, the analogy
between same-sex marriage and interracial marriage in Loving has been the
subject of fierce public debate. Compare Josephine Ross, The Sexualization oj
Difference: A Comparison oj Mixed-Race and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARv.
c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 255,271-79 (2002) (pointing to social science data indicating that same-sex couples and mixed-race couples experience comparable
reactions to their non-traditional choice of mate), with David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics oj Analogy, 12
BYU J. PUB. L. 201, 204, 235-38 (1998) (arguing that those who advocate
same-sex marriage using the "Loving analogy" are making a political statement rather than a legal argument).
182. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
183. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
184. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6. Moreover, Virginia's anti-miscegenation law had a
considerably long history, dating back to the colonial period. Id.

2005]

Sexual Orientation-Blind Marriage in Maryland

99

and tradition of separating the races, particularly with respect to
marriage. 185
A similar body of statutory, case, and constitutional law prohibiting
same-sex marriage exists across the country186 as it does in Maryland.
This orientation-driven restriction of marriage rights, however, is vulnerable to the same defect as the statute invalidated in Loving. Maryland's orientation-blind principle demonstrates that the state's
heterosexual paradigm of marriage rights is repugnant to the equal
protection of the rights of all orientations. Loving also teaches that
outmoded and inequitable historical, social, and legal conventions
cannot restrain the fundamental right to marry. While Maryland's legal history has not specifically recognized same-sex marriage, other
critical aspects of the law have discarded the stubborn historical conventions that restrain other rights and protections of homosexuals.1 87
The significant developments of the sexual orientation-blind evolution also provide the "crucial guideposts for responsible decisionmaking . . . that direct and restrain . . . exposition of the Due Process
Clause" by its simple directive to equalize the rights and protections
afforded Maryland citizens across artificial sexual orientation lines. 188

B.

The Evolution oj Liberty

The equalization of same-sex marriage rights with those of heterosexuals merely requires an acknowledgement of the already expanding notions of liberty in Maryland law. 189 As the Lawrence Court
explained in its decision, the notion of liberty and the rights recognized under it evolve and expand over time. 190 In fact, the Supreme
Court has often emphasized the importance of the evolution of liberty
and due process. 191 One representative example of this emphasis
185. Id. at 3:

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

'Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for
the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for
such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he
did not intend for the races to mix.'
See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Marriage Between Persons of Same Sex, 81
A.L.R.5TH 1, §§ 3-10 (2000).
See supra Part II.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,
125 (1992» (citation omitted).
See supra Part II.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) ("As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom.").
Justice Brennan once wrote:
[T] he genius of our Constitution resides not in any static
meaning that it had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the
adaptability of its great principles to cope with the problems of a
developing Anlerica. A principle to be vital must be of wider application than the mischief that gave it birth. Constitutions are not
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comes from Frank v. Maryland: 192
[W]hat free people have found consistent with their enjoyment of freedom for centuries is hardly to be deemed to violate due process, does not freeze due process within the
confines of historical facts or discredited attitudes. 'It is of
the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of
what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it
does a living principle, due process is not confined within a
permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed
the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.'193
This concept is echoed in the realm of equal protection in Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections: 194
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are
unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have
restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a
given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights.
Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause do change. 195
In 1973, a federal district court in Maryland arguably signaled the
beginning of the state's evolution of liberty with respect to homosexuals in Acanfora v. Board of Education. 196 There, the court found that
"private, consenting, adult homosexuality" should be constitutionally
protected 197 as a valid social relationship not to be restricted by the
government. 198 Underlying this holding was an understanding that
liberty evolves with experience l99 and that resistance to changing mores inhibits the full realization of liberty.20o

192.
193.
194.
195.

196.
197.
198.
199.

200.

ephemeral documents, designed to meet passing occasions. The
future is their care, and therefore, in their application, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.
Brennan, supra note 147, at 495.
359 U.S. 360 (1959).
Id. at 371 (quoting Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949».
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Id. at 669 (citation omitted). Put another, more illustrative, way by the
Ninth Circuit: "[C]onstitutional concepts of equal protection are not immutably frozen like insects trapped in Devonian amber." Dillenburg v.
Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972).
359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), affd 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 85l.
Id. at 850-5l.
Id. at 851 (" 'Great concepts like ... liberty ... were purposely left to gather
meaning from experience. For they relate to the whole domain of social
and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too
well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.''') (quoting Nat'l Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1973) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting».
Id. ("Intolerance of the unconventional halts the growth of liberty.").
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Without decisions like that in Acanfora and the recognition of
trends like that embodied by the sexual orientation-blind principle in
Maryland, the Maryland Declaration of Rights cannot be fulfilled for
the state's almost 13,000 same-sex couples. 201 A rote reliance on the
history's dated conception of fundamental rights not only impairs the
natural evolution of liberty, but also defies reason. This is never more
apparent than in the argument against the recognition of same-sex
marriage, particularly with respect to the history prong of the Glucksberg analysis.
A typical objection to same-sex marriage as a fundamental right can
be found in Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa. 202 In
that case, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that due process did
not contemplate the recognition of same-sex marriage as a fundamental right.203 The court's analysis of same-sex marriage in light of the
right to marry demonstrates the illogic of its conclusion. The court
opined that "[a]lthough same-sex relationships are more open and
have garnered greater societal acceptance in recent years, same-sex
marriages are neither deeply rooted in the legal and social history of
our Nation or state nor are they implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. "204 This reliance on a historical absence of same-sex marriage
presents a dizzying circular argument. In essence, the argument goes
as such: same-sex marriage cannot be recognized because there is no
legal or social history of such a practice, and the reason that practice
does not exist is because there is no legal or social history of same-sex
marriage.
The Standhardt court simply fails to acknowledge what the Supreme
Court has reiterated with respect to evolving fundamental rights 205_
that they must, at some point, have a recognized time and point of
origin. Quite often, it is the judiciary, the final arbiters of the Constitution, who acknowledge the emergence of these rights. 206 Therefore, the court's absolute dependence on the lack of a legal history of
same-sex marriage as rationale for denying that right is an abrogation
of its duty. Standhardt's denial of same-sex marriage rights is even
more perplexing given that the court is willing to concede that homosexual couples have gained considerable social recognition 207- a vital
component of the historical analysis on which the court relied.
See supra note 8.
77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 460 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21).
Id. at 459.
See supra Part III.B.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) ("The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary."); see
also Hillman v. Stockett, 183 Md. 641, 645, 39 A.2d 803, 805 (1944) ("It is
the province and the duty of the Courts to interpret the Constitution .... ").
207. See supra note 204.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
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In sum, the proper careful description of same-sex marriage rights
and their foundation in the historical right to marital choice militates
their recognition. The Glucksberg Court opined in setting forth its twoprong test that "[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices
thus provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking,'
that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.''208
Similarly, Maryland's adaptation of the Glucksberg test should analyze
the assertion of the right to marry by same-sex couples in light of Maryland's history, legal tradition, and practice which, as discussed above,
establishes a trend of orientation equality supportive of such a right.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For over a decade, a trend has developed in Maryland law favoring
the equality of homosexuals and heterosexuals in significant respects.
The sweep of this trend covers crucial aspects of the family relationship and the rights of parents,209 important recognitions of the homosexual lifestyle in criminal law,210 and ground-breaking state and local
anti-discrimination measures. 211 All of these developments, taken together, amounts to a "sexual orientation-blind" concept of parity that
has equalized the legal rights and protections of both homosexuals
and heterosexuals.
This "orientation-blind" principle informs critical aspects of substantive due process analysis governing the interpretation of fundamental rights like marriage. 212 The principle first illustrates that the
exercise of same-sex marriage rights does not involve the creation of a
new right, but rather the recognition of a form of the already wellfounded right to marry.213 Second, the recognition of same-sex marriage is supported by case law discussing the importance of evolving
standards of due process and the expansion of historically-founded
fundamental rights. 214 Under this analysis, then, Maryland's statutory
scheme denying same-sex couples the right to marry is
unconstitutional.

Gregory Carffl'

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

*

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citation omitted).
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part 1I.c.
See supra Part I1IAL
See supra Part 1I1.A.2.
See supra Part 1I1.A.3.
J.D. expected May 2006, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A.,
Lycoming College, 2003.

2005]

Sexual Orientation-Blind Marriage in Maryland

103

APPENDIX ONE: BENEFITS AND OBLIGATIONS GRANTED TO
MARRIED COUPLES AND THEIR CHILDREN BUT DENIED TO
SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THEIR CHILDREN BY MARYLAND LAW
No.

Provision Citation

Description of Provision

1

Agriculture § 2-603 (b) (2)

Grants spouses joint and several eligibility for the
Farmer Disaster Loan Program

2

Business Occupations and
Professions § 10-605.1 (b)

Prohibits lawyers from soliciting personal injury or
wrongful death clients who are relatives to the injured
party until thirty days have passed since the accident
or disaster

3

Business Occupations and
Professions § 10605.2(a)(1)

Prohibitions on lawyer communications and advertisements to potential personal injury and wrongful death
clients related to the injured party

4

Business Occupations and
Professions § 17-319(a)-(d)

Upon a real estate broker's death, family members may
carry on the business for six months and may also qualify for the license itself

5

Business Occupations and
Professions § 17511 (a)( 4)(i)-(b) (2)

Not more than 50% of the interest in a real estate
business may be held by associate brokers or salespersons, unless these individuals are a spouse, parent,
child, sibling, stepparent, stepchild, or stepsibling affiliated with the business

6

Business Regulations § S603(c)

A trustee of a cemetery may not use any trust funds
to either purchase an interest in any contract or
agreement to which his spouse is a party; or make any
loan or investment to his spouse or to any entity or
business owned or under the control of his spouse

7

Business Regulations § 7303(b)(4)

A collection agency license may be denied if the applicant's spouse has had a license revoked or is responsible for the revocation of a license

8

Business Regulations § 8405(f) (1)

Providing that "[a] claim against the [Home Improvement Guaranty] Fund based on the act or omission of
a particular contractor may not be made by ... a
spouse or other immediate relative of the contractor,"
or by "an immediate relative of an employee, officer,
or partner of the contractor.»

9

Business Regulations §§ 11301 (4), 11-314(a)

Requires a person who has been granted horse racing
days for a given year to show the beneficial ownership
of their stock, which includes ownership of a security
by a relative of the individual who lives in the same
home

10

Business Regulations § 17308

If a general business licensee dies, "the surviving
spouse or personal representative ... may do business
under the license for the rest of the term of the license."

11

Business Regulations § 19207(b)(1)-(2)

Grants spousal rights to wear the insignia of fraternal
and patriotic organizations

12

Commercial Law §§ 9102(a) (63), 9-602(8)

States that, for the purposes of secured transactions, a
"debtor or obligor may not waive or vary the rules" of
calculating "a deficiency or surplus when a disposition
is made to ... a person related to the secured party,"
including a spouse and any other relative by blood or
marriage
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13

Commercial Law §§ 9102(a)(63), 9-615(f) (1)

States that, for the purposes of secured transactions,
"[tlhe surplus or deficiency following a disposition is
calculated based on the amount of proceeds that
would have been realized in a disposition complying
with this part to ... a person related to the secured
party," including a spouse and any other relative by
blood or marriage, if "[tlhe transferee in the disposition is ... a person related to the secured party."

14

Commercial Law §§ 9102(a)(63), 9-626(5)

States that in any "action arising from a transaction in
which the amount of a deficiency or surplus is in issue" and "a deficiency or surplus is calculated," then
the burden of establishing that the amount of proceeds of the disposition is considerably below the
price range "that a complying disposition to a person
other than ... a person related to the secured party,"
including a spouse or any other relative by blood or
marriage, would have brought rests on the debtor or
obligor

15

Commercial Law § 12-705

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act's prohibited discriminatory practices include refusing to recognize
the legal name of a married individual, refusing to
consider both applicants' income when both parties
of a marriage apply for a joint account, refusing to issue separate accounts to married persons where each
is creditworthy, and requesting or considering the
credit rating of the applicant's spouse where the applicant is not applying for ajoint account

16 Commercial Law § 15-302

For the purposes of debt collection, "[aln assignment
of wages by a married person is not valid unless also
executed and acknowledged by the assignor's spouse."

17 Corporations and Associations § 5-622

If spouses hold ajoint membership in an electric cooperative, "either one, but not both, may be elected
as a director."

IS

Corporations and Associations § 5-6IUlS(a)(l),
(c) (7)

Exempts a transfer between spouses from the general
rule that a local government has the righ t of first
purchase of any rental facility being purchased for
purposes of conversion

19

Correctional Services § 3S07(b)

States that, "[ulnder the extended work-release program, an inmate who is sentenced ... for desertion
or nonsupport of a spouse, child, or destitute parent
may be granted the privilege of leaving actual confinement."

20

Correctional Services § 3909(a)

"On application of a relative, the body of an executed
inmate shall be returned to the relative at the relative's cost."

21

Correctional Services § 9601(e)(I)

Custody of a baby born to an inmate may be granted
to the father or other relative

22

Courts and Judicial Procedure § 1-705

Supplementation of a judge's salary is prohibited, inc1uding any payment from a political subdivision to
the surviving spouse of the judge

23

Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 2-309(f) (5)(i)

The Calvert County Commission may provide a pension to be paid to the surviving spouse of a county
sheriff

Description of Provision
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24

Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-502(b)

A "husband may maintain an action of slander against
any person for words spoken falsely and maliciously
about his wife for her character or reputation for
chastity before or during the marriage."

25

Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-904(a)-(b)

A wrongful death action "shall be for the benefit of
the wife, husband, parent, and child of the deceased
person." If none of these persons exist, "an action
shall be for the benefit of any person related to the
deceased person by blood or marriage who was substantially dependent upon the deceased."

26

Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-1603

Provides that, "a civil action for damages for the
death of an individual caused by the individual's use
of a controlled dangerous substance may be brought
... by a parent, legal guardian, child, spouse, or sibling of the individual."

27

Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 5-901 (2)

The Statute of Frauds bestows the right to sue on an
agreement made in consideration of marriage, if written evidence of it exists and is signed by the allegedly
breaching party

28

Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 6-203(e)(4)

The venue for an adoption proceeding may be the
place in which "[tlhe person to be adopted is domiciled, if he is related to the petitioner by blood or
marriage."

29

Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 7-406

Under certain circumstances, former members of the
armed forces and their family members are entitled
to copies of court records, including marriage
records, without charge

30

Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 8202(5) (i) (1) (c)

The juror qualification form asks about the occupation of the potential juror's spouse

31

Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 9-105

Confidential communications between spouses are
privileged information

32

Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 9-106

A spouse of a person on trial for a crime may not be
compelled to testify, with some exceptions. If the
spouse refused to testify in any case where the spouse
was the victim, the court clerk must make a record of
the refusal, and when a request for expungement in
an assault case is made, the record of the spouse's refusal is not expunged

33

Courts & Judicial Proceedings § 11-108 (a)(2)(i) (2)

Includes marital care in the category of noneconomic
damages

34

Criminal Law § 7110(c)(3)

It is a defense to the crime of theft that the property
involved was the defendant's spouse's property, unless

at the time of the alleged theft they were living in
separate residences
35

Criminal Procedure § 11103

If the victim of a violent crime dies, a spouse, surviving spouse, child, or sibling, parent, or legal guardian
may file, in the case against the defendant, an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from an interlocutory or final order that denies
or fails to consider various rights secured to the victim
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36

Criminal Procedure § 11602(2)

For the purposes of restitution for a crime against a
burial site under Criminal Law § 10-404, a person related by blood or marriage to a person buried may
act on behalf of the victim of a crime

37

Criminal Procedure § 11SOS

A victim's spouse and dependents-defined in § 11SOl as spouses, children, and others principally supported by the victim-under certain circumstances
are eligible for awards under the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board

3S

Criminal Procedure § 11S11(a)(5)

In addition to monetary awards from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, a parent, child, or spouse
of a victim is eligible "to receive psychiatric, psychological, or mental health counseling."

39

Criminal Procedure §§ 111001 (f), 11-1002

Entides a victim's representative, which includes a
spouse, child, sibling, or parent of a victim of a crime,
to certain notices, services, and treatment during the
investigation and prosecution of a crime

40

Criminal Procedure §§ 111001 (f), 11-1003

Entides a victim's representative, which includes a
spouse, child, sibling, or a parent of a victim of a
crime, to certain notices, services, and treatment during the investigation and prosecution of a juvenile
crime

41

Education § 3-58-02

A spouse may not serve on the Frederick County
Board of Education if the other spouse is an administrator or teacher in the district. Conversely, a spouse
may not be hired as an administrator or teacher in
the district if the other spouse serves on the Board,
unless the board member first resigns

42

Education § 4-122.1

Specifies special educational provisions for children in
"informal kinship care relationships," which are living
arrangements in which a relative-defined as an adult
related to the child by blood or marriage within the
fifth degree of consanguinity-of a child "provides for
the care and custody of the child due to a serious
family hardship."

43

Education § 7-101 (b)(l)

Provides that, "each child shall attend a public school
in the county where the child is domiciled with the
child's parent, guardian, or relative providing informal kinship care."

44

Education § 15-106.4

The spouse of an active duty member of the armed
forces is exempt from paying nonresident tuition at a
public institution of higher education

45

Education § 18601 (d) (3) (iii) (2)

Surviving spouses are eligible to apply for the Edward
T. Conroy Memorial Scholarship Program

46

Education § 18-1009 (repealed by the Higher Education Loan Corporation
and Program - Repeal,
2005 Md. Laws 1114).

Deferment from repayment of higher education loans
is authorized for up to three years, during which the
borrower is unable to secure employment by reason
of care required by a spouse who is disabled; if both
spouses have loans, then both spouses payments are
combined in order to satisfy the minimum total annual payment
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47

Election Law § 13-231

States that, "[clontributions or loans to a campaign finance entity of a candidate from the personal funds
of the ... candidate's spouse are not subject to the
contribution limits under § 13-226.... " The section
also states that "[elxpenditures from personal funds
by the ... candidate's spouse for personal expenses
of the candidate for filing fees, telecommunication
services, travel, and food are not contributions."

48

Election Law § 13408(b)(2)

Provides that, "[plublication expenses may be paid
from ... the personal funds of the ... spouse of the
incumbent," under certain circumstances

49

Election Law § 14101 (f) (2)(i)

For the purposes of disclosure, a contribution does
not include "a bona fide gift by a spouse or relative
within the third degree of consanguinity."

50

Environment §§ 6-801, 6818(a)( 1 )(ii)

Prohibits any person performing lead-contaminated
dust testing or conducting an inspection to be a related party to the owner, which includes any person related to an owner by blood or marriage

51

Estates and Trusts § 1-202

A surviving spouse is defined as: no person who has
received an absolute divorce from the decedent or
whose marriage was annulled; no person who participates in a marriage ceremony with a third person, after a decree or judgment of divorce or annulment obtained by the decedent; no person convicted of bigam}'while married to the decedent

52

Estates and Trusts § 1-205

Defines a child as "a legitimate child, and adopted
child, and an illegitimate child to the extent provided
in §§ 1-206 through 1-208 of this title. A child does
not include a stepchild, foster child, or a grandchild
or more remote descendant."

53

Estates and Trusts §§ 1205, 1-209

Defines issue as "every living lineal descendant except
a lineal descendant of a living lineal descendant." Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate children are considered lineal descendants

54

Estates and Trusts § 2-108

The surviving spouse of every elected judge of the
Court of Baltimore City shall be paid one half of the
pension to which his spouse was entitled at the time
of this death, provided certain requirements are met

55

Estates and Trusts § 3-102

In the event of intestate succession, the sury.;ving
spouse is provided at least a fractional share of the
decedent's estate; if there is no other surviving issue
or parent, the spouse is entitled to the whole estate

56

Estates and Trusts § 3104(e)

In the event of intestate succession, if there is no surviving spouse and no surviving blood relative entitled
to inherit, the estate shall be divided into equal
shares for the stepchildren of the decedent; stepchild
means the child of any spouse of the decedent if such
spouse was not divorced from the decedent

57

Estates and Trusts § 3201 (a)

In the event of intestate succession, "[tlhe surviving
spouse is entitled to receive an allowance of $5,000
for personal use."

58

Estates and Trusts § 3203(b)

Provides that, "[il nstead of property left to the surviving spouse by will, the surviving spouse may elect to
take a one-third share of the net estate if there is also
a surviving issue, or a one-half share ... if there is
not a surviving issue."
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59

Estates and Trusts § 4105(3)

The event of a marriage followed by the birth or
adoption of a child by the testator subsequent to the
execution of a will effects to revoke the will

60

Estates and Trusts § 4-401

Spousal exception to the general rule that a legatee
who fails to smvive the testator by thirty days is considered to have predeceased the testator, unless otherwise provided in the will

61

Estates and Trusts §§ 4501(d),4-508(a)

Provides that, if an anatomical gift "is only a part of
the body, promptly following the removal of the part
named, custody of the remaining parts of the body
shall be transferred to the next of kin," which includes a spouse

62

Estates and Trusts §§ 4501(d),4-509(a)

States that, "[t]he Chief Medical Examiner, the deputy chief medical examiner, or an assistant medical examiner may provide an organ or tissue upon the request of the federally designated organ procurement
organization or tissue bank" if, inter alia, "[a] reasonable, unsuccessful search has been made by the treating physician and the hospital where the patient is located to contact the next of kin [including a spouse]
... [and] [n]o objection by the next of kin is known
by the medical examiner."

63

Estates and Trusts §§ 4501(d),4-509.1(a)(3)

States that, if there is a need for corneal tissue for either transplant or research, "the Chief Medical Examiner, the deputy chief medical examiner, or an assistant medical examiner shall provide the cornea upon
the request of the Medical Eye Bank of Maryland, Incorporated, or the Lions of District 22-C Eye Bank
and Research Foundation, Incorporated," if the next
of kin does not make his or her objection known to
the medical examiner

64

Estates and Trusts § 4503(b) (1)

In the event that a decedent has not made a gift of
all or part of the decedent's body, and not expressed
otherwise, a surviving spouse has first priority in deciding whether or not to donate all or part of the
body.

65

Estates and Trusts § 4-504

A donee "hospital, surgeon, or physician that receives
a gift for the purpose of a transplantation may not
bill the estate of the donor, a surviving spouse of the
donee, any heirs of the donor, or an insurer of the
donor for the costs associated with the removal of the
gift."

66

Estates and Trusts § 5104(3)

In granting letters in administrative or judicial probate, or in appointing a successor personal representative, or a special administrator, spouses are given
third priority only subsequent to "personal representatives named in a will admitted to probate" and "personal representatives nominated in accordance with a
power conferred in a will admitted to probate."

67

Estates and Trusts § 5-105

Spousal exception to the general rule that letters may
not be granted to non-citizens

68

Estates and Trusts § 5-601

Non-spouse can avoid probate when the estate has
value of $30,000 or less; if the surviving spouse is the
sole legatee or heir, he or she can avoid probate
when the estate has value of $50,000 or less
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69

Estates and Trusts § 5702(2)

Provides that, "[aln election for modified administration may be filed by personal representative of an estate within 3 months from the date of appointment"
if among other things, "[alII trustees of each trust
that is a residuary legatee are limited to the decedent's: Personal representative; Surviving spouse; and
Children."

Description of Provision

70

Estates and Trusts § 9-103

Bequests to non-spouses are more vulnerable to abatement than bequests to spouses

71

Estates and Trusts § 11106(a)

Authorizes fiduciary to exercise discretion to maximize estate tax marital deduction

72

Estates and Trusts § 13-207

A spouse is automatically third in line to be appointed as guardian for a minor or disabled person,
and may be elevated to first or second

73

Estates and Trusts §§ 13301(j),13-307(c)

States that, if no custodian has been nominated
under the Maryland Uniform Transfers to Minors Act,
or all persons so nominated as custodian die before
the transfer or are unable, decline, or are ineligible
to serve, a transfer under this section may be made to
an adult member of the minor's family, which includes the minor's parents, stepparent, spouse, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt, whether of
whole or half blood or by adoption, or to a trust company unless the property exceeds $10,000 in value

74

Estates and Trusts §§ 13301 (j), 13-318(d)(l)

States that, if a custodian is ineligible, dies, or becomes incapacitated without having effectively designated a successor and the minor has attained the age
of 14 years, the minor may designate as successor custodian an adult member of the minor's family, which
includes the minor's parents, stepparent, spouse,
grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt, whether
of whole or half blood or by adoption

75

Estates and Trusts §§ 13301 (j), 13-318(d) (3)

States that, a minor who has attained the age of 14
years, an adult member of the minor's family, which
includes the minor's parents, stepparent, spouse,
grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt, whether
of whole or half blood or by adoption, may petition
the court for an accounting by the custodian or the
custodian's legal representative; or a determination of
responsibility, as between the custodial property and
the custodian personally, for claims against the custodial property unless the responsibility has been adjudicated in an action under § 13-317 of this subtitle to
which the minor or the minor's legal representative
was a party

76

Estates and Trusts § 13503(a)

States that, "[al minor who holds title to property as
a tenant by the entirety with a spouse who has
reached the age of majority is authorized to join with
the spouse in any deed ... note, or financing statement in the same manner and effect as an adult."

77

Estates and Trusts § 13-707

A disabled person's spouse is automatically third in
line to be appointed guardian, and may be expressly
elevated higher
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78

Estates and Trusts § 14-104

Prohibits a judge of any court or any clerk of court or
register of wills from serving as a trustee of any inter
vivos or testamentary trust "unless he is the surviving
spouse of the grantor of the trust."

79

Estates and Trusts § 14-107

A trust may not be terminated under this section if
the trust would be eligible for the marital deduction
from the federal estate tax or for federal gift tax purposes under the IRS Code, "unless all beneficiaries
agree that all of the trust estate shall be distributed to
the spouse of the creator of the trust."

80

Estates and Trusts § 14-109

Various restrictions on a trustee's powers do not apply
"if a marital deduction from the trust property would
not be allowed to a spouse who is a trustee and to
whom a marital deduction would otherwise be allowed under the [IRS] Code."

81

Estates and Trusts §§ 14401(i),14-403(h)(S)

States that, if the trustee of a discretionary trust is unable or unwilling to serve and no successor trustee
will serve, an adult member of the beneficiary's family, which includes a spouse, descendant, stepchild,
parent, stepparent, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, whether of whole or half blood or by adoption, may petition the court to designate a successor
trustee

82

Estates and Trusts §§ 14401(i),14-40SU)(I)(iv)

States that, a member of the beneficiary's family,
which includes a spouse, descendant, stepchild, parent, stepparent, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle,
aunt, whether of whole or half blood or by adoption,
"may request an accounting of trust property and
transactions" from the trustee of a discretionary trust

83

Estates and Trusts § IS-116

Provides duties of loyalty and fair dealing for trustees
"regarding the acquisition, retention, and ownership
of a contract of insurance on the life of the grantor
of the trust, or on the lives of the grantor and the
grantor's spouse, children, or grandchildren."

84

Estates and Trusts § ISS02.2(d)(l)

Provides that, a trustee may not make an otherwise
lawful adjustment "[t]hat diminishes the income interest in a trust that requires all of the income to be
paid at least annually to a spouse and for which an estate tax or gift tax marital deduction would be allowed ... if the trustee did not have the power to
make the adjustment."

8S

Estates and Trusts § IS-S03

States that, in the case of an estate, or after an income interest in a trust ends, in the case of an estate,
the following rules apply: "A fiduciary shall distribute
the remaining net income ... to all other beneficiaries . . . but excluding a beneficiary other than a
surviving spouse who receives a pecuniary amount
that is not in trust."

86

Estates and Trusts § ISS20(a)(l)

Under certain conditions, a "spouse may require the
trustee to make property not productive of income into property productive of income, convert property
within a reasonable time, or may request the trustee
exercise the power conferred by § IS.S02.02 of this
subtitle."
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87

Estates and Trusts §§ 16101(d),16-108(c)

States that, a registering entity is released from all
claims to a security by heirs, including the surviving
spouse of a deceased owner, if it registers the transfer
of the security in accordance with the Maryland Uniform Transfer-on-Death (TOO) Security Registration
Act and "does so in good faith reliance on the registration, on this title, and on information provided to
it" by affidavit of the personal representative of the
deceased owner, the surviving beneficiary, the surviving beneficiary's representatives, or by other information available to the registering entity

88

Family Law § 3-102(a)

Creates an action for breach of promise to marry for
a pregnant individual

89

Family Law § 3-104(b)

Allows a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument for payment or settlement of a claim for breach
of promise to marry or alienation of affections to enforce the instrument

90

Family Law § 4-202

Creates a right and sets forth a procedure for a surviving spouse to bring a personal action to recover the
rights of the deceased spouse

91

Family Law § 4-205(d)

Allows a depositary who received a deposit from a woman before or during her marriage in fraud of the
woman's husband's creditors, to attach or restrain the
payment of the money

92

Family Law § 4-206(a)

States that, whenever any interest or estate of any
kind of property within the state is in any way transferred from husband to wife or in any way transferred
by the couple to another party, the fact of such transactions does not give a present creditor "any other or
greater right, lien, or cause of action against the interest or estate" than had the property been transferred by the husband directly to a third person

93

Family Law § 4-206(b)

States that, the fact of a transfer of any kind of an interest or estate from a husband to a wife, or the recital of it in any instrument of writing, does not constitute notice to any third person of the possibility of, or
actual, "existence of any present creditor of the husband."

94

Family Law § 4301 (a) (l)(i)

States that, an individual is not liable for the debts
contracted by that person's spouse or any claim or demand that arose before the marriage

95

Family Law § 4-301 (b)-(c)

States that, a husband is not liable for the torts or
contracts of his wife, or for any judgment or decree
against his wife

96

Family Law § 4-301 (d)

States that, a wife's property acquired before or after
marriage "is not liable for the payment of her husband's debts."

97

Family Law § MOl

States the General Assembly's policy and "responsibility to provide services that prevent ... family dissolution and breakdown that require [ 1 protective services
or out-of-home placement."

98

Family Law § M02(b)

Establishes a program of services to families with children, including, functional services to help a family
resolve a situational crisis, family and marital counseling, referral services, and home management services
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99

Family Law § 4-403(b)

Requires that, the Department of Human Resources
"coordinate for families with children the delivery of
day care, health, educational, mental health, employment, housing, and crisis services."

100

Family Law § 4-602(b)

States the General Assembly's intent to provide displaced homemakers, as defined in Family Law § 4601, with "counseling, training, employment placement assistance, services, and health care."

101

Family Law § 4-606(a)

Requires that, Multipurpose Service Centers of the
Department of Human Resources provide: "counseling; training; skills; services; and education" to assist
displaced homemakers in obtaining gainful employment

102

Family Law § 4-607

Requires that, Multipurpose Service Centers of the
Department of Human Resources provide job counseling, job training, employment placement, and service programs to displaced homemakers

103

Family Law § 5-202

States that, children of annulled or void marriages remain the legitimate children of the parties of the
marriage

104

Family Law § 5308(b) (1) (ii) (repealed by
the Permanency for Families and Children Act of
2005, 2005 Md. Laws page
number forthcoming
Ch464) (to be reenacted
as Family Law §§ 5341 (a) (2) (ii) (adoption
without prior termination
of parental rights), 5352(a)(2) (ii) (adoption
with prior termination of
parental rights), 5-3A35(a) (2) (ii) (private adoption), 5-3B-24(a)(2) (ii) (independent adoption))

Entitles adoptive children to all the rights and privileges as well as obligations of a child born to the
adoptive parent in wedlock

105

Family Law § 5-315(a) (repealed by the Permanency
for Families and Children
Act of 2005, 2005 Md.
Laws 2581) (to be reenacted as Family Law §§ 5331 (b) (2) (adoption without prior termination of
parental rights), 5345(b) (2) (adoption with
prior termination of parental rights), 5-3A29(c) (1) (private adoption), 5-3B-13(b) (2) (independent adoption))

Requires that, a spouse of a petitioner for adoption
join the adoption petition except in certain circumstances
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106

Family Law § 5-321 (1) (repealed by the Permanency
for Families and Children
Act of 2005, 2005 Md.
Laws 2581)

Allows an independent adoption by a spouse of the
natural parent of the adoptee without the requirement of advice of counsel, adoption counseling, written consent, the assessment of attorneys fees and
costs, an accounting report, and a medical history of
the natural paren ts

107

Family Law § 5-329.1(a)
(repealed by the Permanency for Families and
Children Act of 2005, 2005
Md. Laws 2581) (to be reenacted as Family Law
§§ 5-356 (adoption with
prior termination of parental rights), 5-3A-39 (private adoption))

Allows adoptive parents to obtain access to an adoptive child's medical or other health records

108

Family Law § 5-507 (b) (1)

Provides an exception to the rule that a person
should be licensed by the Social Services Administration as a child placement agency before that person
may engage in the placement of minors if the person
with whom the child is to be placed is "related to the
child by blood or marriage within 4 degrees of consanguinity or affinity."

109

Family Law § 5-508 (b) (2)

Provides an exception to the rule that a person
should be licensed by the Social Services Administration as a child care home before that "person may exercise care, custody, or control" of minors if the person is "related to the child by blood or marriage within five degrees of consanguinity or affinity."

110

Family Law § 5-552(b) (1)

Allows family day care homes to operate without being registered "if the day care provider ... is related
to each child by blood or marriage."

III

Family Law § 5-1027(c) (1)

Establishes "a rebuttable presumption that a child is
the legitimate child of the man to whom its mother
was married at the time of conception."

112

Family Law § 51032(b)(1)(iii)

States that, a father in a paternity action is no longer
responsible for support to a child upon the child's
marriage

113

Family Law § 7-101 (b)

Requires that, a spouse seeking a divorce must present corroborating testimony

114

Family Law § 7-102

Provides a married individual with a cause of action
for limited divorce

115

Family Law § 7-103

Provides a married individual with a cause of action
for absolute divorce

116

Family Law § 7-103.2(b)

Allows a court to order a married couple, seeking a
divorce, to participate in an educational seminar prior
to granting a divorce decree

117

Family Law § 7-107(a), (b)

Allows a court to order a party to pay reasonable expenses, including: "suit money; counsel fees; and
costs," to a party for prosecuting or defending an action for divorce

118

Family Law § 8-101

Allows a married couple to create enforceable private
agreements regarding "alimony, support, property
rights, or personal rights."
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119 Family Law § 8-103(a)

Allows a court to modify the private agreement between spouses to reflect the best interest of the child

120

Family Law § 8-201 (e)

Defines marital property as any property acquired by
one or both parties during the marriage, any real
property titled as tenants by the entireties, and excludes property obtained before the marriage, acquired by inheritance or gift, excluded by agreement,
or directly traceable to any of the forgoing

121

Family Law § 8-203(a)

Allows a court to determine marital property in a proceeding for an annulment or absolute divorce

122 Family Law § 8-204(a)

Allows a court to determine the value of all marital
property in a proceeding for an annulment or absolute divorce

Family Law § 8-205(a)

Allows a court to grant a monetary award or transfer
ownership in a retirement account in a proceeding
for an annulment or absolute divorce

123

124 Family Law § 8-207(a)

125

Family Law §§ 8-208, 8-209

126 Family Law § 8-210

Allows a court to determine which property is the
family home and family use personal property before
or when granting an annulment or a limited or absolute divorce
Allows a court to award the possession and use of the
family home or family use property as well as allocate
financial responsibilities of that property in granting
an annulment or absolute divorce; allows a court to
set terms and conditions on and modify an award of
possession and use of the family home or family use
property
States the circumstances requiring the termination of
an order for the possession and use of the family
home or family use property

127

Family Law § 8-212

Allows a Maryland court to exercise its powers with respect to the use and possession of the family home
and family use property in an annulment or absolute
divorce granted in a foreign jurisdiction

128

Family Law § 8-214(a), (b)

Allows a court to order a party to pay reasonable expenses, including: "suit money; counsel fees; and
costs," to a party for prosecuting or defending an action for division of marital property

129

Family Law § 9-101.1 (b) (2)

Allows a court to consider abuse of a spouse in making determinations in a custody or visitation proceeding

130

Family Law § 9-104

Provides a noncustodial parent with "access to medical, dental, and educational records concerning the
child."

131

Family Law § 9-105

Provides a court with several remedies for a party who
can show that another "party to a custody or visitation
order has unjustifiably denied or interfered ",;th visitation granted by a custody or visitation order."

132

Family Law § 9-106

Allows a court to require a party to a custody or visitation order to give 45 days notice to the other party of
their intention to relocate the permanent residence
of the child
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133

Family Law § 9-302(a) (1)

Provides a Maryland equity court with 'Jurisdiction
over custody and visitation of a child who is removed
from [Maryland] by a parent of the child, if ... the
parents are separated or divorced" and Maryland was
either "the marital domicile ... or the domicile in
which the marriage contract was last performed."

134

Family Law § 9.5-310(d)

Precludes the invocation of the spousal communication privilege or a defense of immunity based on the
husband and wife relationship

135

Family Law § 10-103

States that, the State's Attorney, the Child Support
Enforcement Administration of the Department of
Human Resources, or a local support enforcement office may "use any civil or criminal remedy to enforce
a child or spousal support order."

136

Family Law § 10-121 (a)

Allows a court to impose an earnings withholding notice pursuant to a child or spousal support order

137

Family Law § 10134(a) (3) (ii)

Establishes an element in a motion for a support order obligor to terminate a withholding order that the
arrearage of support that gave rise to the withholding
order was inter alia the result of the death of the obligor's spouse

138

Family Law § 10-201(a),
(b)

Provides a criminal offense and penalty for willful failure to provide for the support of a spouse without
just cause

139

Family Law § 10-202(a)

Allows a court to impose an order to pay spousal support upon the conviction of a party for willful failure
to pay spousal support or by consent of the accused
party

140

Family Law § 10-207(a)

Allows a court to order the Commissioner of Correction to deduct an amount of an inmate's earnings in
order to pay the inmate's spousal support order

141

Family Law § 10-328(g),
(h)

Precludes the invocation of both the spousal communication and testimonial privilege so that a spouse
may be compelled to testifY against the other in any
proceeding under the Maryland Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act

142

Family Law § 10-332(a)

Allows a court to issue a support order, including
spousal support, for an individual or support enforcement agency from another state

143

Family Law § 10-338 (a)

Provides a means for a support order obligor to "contest the validity or enforcement of an income withholding order issued in another state and received directly by an employer in [Maryland]."

144

Family Law §§ 11-101, 11106

Allows a court to award definite and indefinite alimony as part of a decree of divorce or annulment

145

Family Law § 11-102(a)

Allows a court to award alimony pendente lite as part of
a proceeding for a divorce or annulment

146

Family Law § 11-104(a)

Allows a court to award alimony pendente lite as part of
a proceeding for a divorce against a nonresident defendant

147

Family Law § 11-105

Allows a Maryland court to award alimony to either
party of a divorce or annulment granted by a court of
another jurisdiction
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148

Family Law § 11-107

Allows a court to extend an alimony award period
and modifY the amount awarded

149

Family Law § 11-108(2)

States that, alimony terminates upon the remarriage
of the recipient

150

Family Law § 11-110(a),
(b)

Allows a court to order a party to pay reasonable expenses, including "suit money; counsel fees; and
costs," to a party for prosecuting or defending an action for alimony

151

Family Law § 11-111 (a)

Allows a court to allocate "additional costs of providing hospital, medical, or surgical benefits" between
the parties to a divorce either pendente lite or after the
divorce is granted

152

Family Law § 11-112

Allows a court to order a party to pay alimony, pay a
lump sum, or give bond to the state to provide for
the support one party found "permanently and incurably insane."

153

Family Law § 12-101(a)

Allows a court to award child support, both pendente
lite and for a fixed period

154

Family Law § 12-101(d)

Allows a court to order a party to pay a portion or all
of "the mother's medical and hospital expenses for
pregnancy, confinement, and recovery and ... medical support for the child, including neonatal expenses."

155

Family Law § 12-102(b)

Allows a court to order a parent to include a child in
their health insurance coverage as part of any support
order

156

Family Law § 12-103(a)

Allows a court to order a party to pay costs and counsel fees in any case involving the application, recovery, or enforcement of any custody, support, or visitation proceeding

157

Financial Institutions § 6302(b) (5)

Allows a spouse of an individual who is eligible for
membership in a credit union to be a member

158

Financial Institutions § 8307(d)

With regards to Savings and Loan Associations, the
spouse of the Division Director or any Division staff
"may not become indebted to any association or related entity that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Division Director."

159

Financial Institutions § 11301 (a) (1)

Exempts the extension of credit or granting of a loan
between relatives from the licensing provision required for installment loans

160

Financial Institutions § 11405

Allows the Commissioner of Financial Regulation in
the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation
to deny the application for a license to deal as a sales
finance company if the spouse of the applicant has,
inter alia, had a license revoked

161

Financial Institutions § 11502(b)(8)

Exempts a person "making a mortgage loan to a borrower who is that person's spouse ... child's spouse
... or grandchild's spouse" from the licensing requirement for mortgage lenders

162

Health General § 4215(e)(5) (iii)

States that, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene may not deny inspection of a burial permit record to the spouse of the deceased "whose human remains have been disinterred or reinterred."

2005]

Sexual Orientation-Blind Marriage in Maryland

117

No.

Provision Citation

Description of Provision

163

Health General § 4-217(e)

Requires the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene
to include "a notice which advises that certain individ·
uals may be entitled to continuation of group health
insurance benefits" with every copy of a death certifi·
cate

164

Health General § 5·
501 (b)(l) (ii)

Allows a spouse to grant consent for a postmortem
examination of a body by a physician if the spouse
has assumed control of the body for its final disposition

165

Health General § 5509(c)(1)

States that, the surviving spouse of a deceased individ·
ual has first priority to "the right to arrange for the fi·
nal disposition of the body of the decedent" if the de·
cedent had not executed a document that expresses
the decedent's wishes concerning the disposition of
their body

166

Health General § 5·
602(b)(1), (3)

Prohibits a spouse of an owner, operator, or employ·
ee of a health care facility from which the declarant
of an advance directive is receiving health care from
serving as a health care agent

167

Health General § 5605(a) (2)

Allows a patient's spouse "to make decisions about
health care for a person who has been certified to be
incapable of making an informed decision and who
has not appointed a health care agent."

168

Health General § 7·1003(f)

Provides that, "[i]f it is feasible to do so and not med·
ically contraindicated, spouses who are both residents
of a licensed residential facility [for developmental
disabilities] shall be given the opportunity to share a
room."

169

Health General § 71003(i) (2)

Provides that, "[e]ach married individual in a licensed
residential facility [for developmental disabilities]
shall have privacy during a visit by the spouse."

170

Health General § 10616(c) (2)

Prohibits a certificate for involuntary admission to a
state mental health facility to be used "if the physician
or psychologist who signed the certificate ... [i]s related, by ... marriage, to the individual or to the applicant."

171

Health General § 10807(e) (2)

Prohibits an individual from being transported between mental health facilities without the individual's
spouse

172

Health General § 13104(a) (2) (iv)

Prohibits a voting member of the State Advisory
Council on Hereditary and Congenital Disorders appointed by the Governor from being a "spouse of a
health professional ... or spouse of an individual involved in the administration or ownership of any
health care institution or health insurance organization."

173

Health General § 15122(a)

States that, "[t]he spouse of a [Maryland Medical and
Pharmacy Assistance] Program recipient is responsible
for payments for the health care needs of the Program recipient to the extent that the spouse is able to
pay."
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175

Health General §§ 16101(0, 16-203(a) (4)

Exempts from the cost of care of a recipient of services in a facility or program that is operated or funded by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
who is a responsible relative, which includes a spouse
of a recipient, if the spouse "has been the victim of
sexual abuse, physical abuse, or a crime of violence
... perpetrated by the recipient of services."

176

Health General §§ 16101(0, 16-204(d)(4)

States that, if a responsible relative, which includes
the spouse of a recipient of services, "who is liable for
the cost of care of the recipient of services" has submitted fraudulent information or misrepresented assets, thus avoiding any part of the claim for the cost
of care, "there is no limitation on the time in which
the claim may be brought against the estate."

177

Health General §§ 16101(0, 16-404(c)

States that, the liability of a responsible relative, which
includes the spouse of a recipient of services, "for the
cost of care of a mentally retarded individual in a residential, state facility" ends when the cost of care has
been charged for a period or periods that total 16
years

178

Health General § 19-310

For the purposes of organ donation, a spouse has first
priority to consent as the deceased's representative to
any donation

179

Health General § 19344(h), (k)

Spouses who are both admitted to a hospital or related institution "shall be given the opportunity to share
a room," if it is feasible and medically appropriate.
Further, "each married resident of a facility shall have
privacy during a visit by the spouse."

180

Health General § 20-102

States that, minors have "the same capacity as an
adult to consent to medical treatment" if the minor is
married or is a parent. Further, "without the consent
of or over the express objection of a minor," physicians and others may "give a parent, guardian, or custodian of the minor or the spouse of the parent information about treatment needed by the minor."

181

Health General § 20-104

"Without the consent of or over the express objection
of a minor," various physicians and others may "give a
parent, guardian, or custodian of the minor or the
spouse of the parent information about treatment of
a mental disorder needed by the minor."

182

Health General § 20-105

For the purposes of informal kinship care, "relative,"
as it relates to a minor's consent, is defined as "an
adult related to the child by blood or marriage within
the fifth degree of consanguinity."

183

Health Occupations §§ 1301(j)(I),1-302(a)

Prohibits a health care practitioner from referring a
patient to a health care entity in which the health
care practitioner's spouse owns a beneficial interest
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184

Health Occupations §§ 13010)(1),1-303(a)-(b)

Requires a health care practitioner making a lawful
referral to "disclose the existence of the beneficial interest" of a spouse in the health care entity to which
the referral is being made

185

Health Occupations §§ 7101 (s), 7-308(a)

Requires the Maryland State Board of Morticians to
"issue a surviving spouse license to an applicant if the
applicant ... fils the surviving spouse of a licensed
mortician or licensed funeral director whose license
was in good standing at the time of death and who
was operating and wholly or partly owned a mortuary
science business" at the time of death

186

Health Occupations §§ 7101(s), 7-308.1

Requires that, "[a] personal representative who wishes
to continue operation of a mortuary science business
upon expiration of the executor license must be ...
the holder of a surviving spouse license."

187

Health Occupations §§ 7101 (s), 7-310(c) (2)

Requires the Maryland State Board of Morticians to
"issue a funeral establishment license to a funeral establishment that . . . [w] ill be owned and operated by
... a holder of a surviving spouse ... license."

188

Health Occupations §§ 7101(s),7-405(b)(l)

Allows a holder of a surviving spouse license "to offer
or agree ... to provide services or merchandise
under a pre-need contract."

189

Health Occupations §§ 7101(s),7-407(a)

Requires a licensed funeral director to "provide to the
surviving spouse ... of the deceased or authorized
representative a notice which advises that certain individuals may be entitled to continuation of group
health insurance benefits."

190

Health Occupations §§ 7101 (s), 7-410(c)

States that the surviving spouse of a deceased individual has first priority to "the right to arrange for the final disposition of the body of the decedent" if the decedent had not executed a document that expresses
the decedent's wishes concerning the disposition of
his or her body

191

Insurance § 8-606 (a) , (d)

Requires that, "[b]efore an offer to purchase a policy
can be made to the viator, a viatical settlement provider shall provide the viator with a disclosure statement" containing specified language notifYing the viator of the requirement to disclose the identity of the
insured's spouse

192

Insurance § 10-120(a)

Allows the Maryland Insurance Commissioner to "issue a temporary license to act as an insurance producer" to a surviving spouse of a deceased or a
spouse of a mentally or physically disabled insurance
producer

193

Insurance § 12-202 (b) (1)

Allows a spouse to put into effect a life or health insurance policy on the other spouse

194

Insurance § 14-115(e)(9)

Prohibits a member of the board of directors of a
nonprofit health services plan from being another
member's spouse, child's spouse, spouse's parent, or
sibling's spouse

195

Insurance § 15-201 (c) (2)

Allows a health insurance policy to insure a policyholder's spouse upon application of an adult member
of a family
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196

Insurance § 15-215

Allows an insurer to include in a policy an optional
provision permitting an indemnity for loss of life payable to an estate or beneficiary under 18 years of age
which may be paid to any relative by blood or connection by marriage

197

Insurance § 15-404(b)

Allows the coverage on a group or blanket health insurance policy of a subscriber's dependent children at
any time and without evidence of insurability if the
children were covered under the policy of the subscriber's deceased spouse

198

Insurance § 15-407(b) (2)

Requires a group contract insurance provider to provide continuation coverage for a qualified secondary
beneficiary, which includes the spouse of the insured,
after the insured's death

199

Insurance § 15-408(b) (2)

Requires a group contract insurance provider to provide continuation coverage for a qualified secondary
beneficiary, which includes the spouse of the insured,
after the divorce of the insured and the beneficiary
spouse

200

Insurance § 15-409(d)(5)

Requires a group contract insurance provider to provide continuation coverage for the spouse of the insured if the group contract provides benefits for
spouses and the insured's spouse was covered on the
group contract before the insured was involuntarily
terminated

201

Insurance § 15-411 (a)

Requires a group contract insurance provider to provide continuous open enrollment to allow "a married
employee who is enrolled ... to alter the terms of
the employee's coverage to include the employee's
spouse ... if the employee's spouse loses coverage
under another group health insurance contract ...
because of the involuntary termination of the spouse's
employment."

202

Insurance § 15-414(b)

Requires a group contract insurance provider to "provide the same conversion rights and conditions to a
covered dependent spouse of an employee ... that
are provided to the covered employee ... if the dependent spouse ceases to be a qualified familymember because of divorce or the death of the employee."

203

Insurance § 15-810(b)

An insurer or nonprofit health service plan that provides pregnancy-related benefits "may not exclude
benefits for all outpatient expenses arising from in vitro fertilization procedures performed on the ... dependent spouse of a policyholder or subscriber."

204

Insurance § 15-1206(c) (3)

States that, employees who have group spousal coverage may not be eligible for certain other forms of insurance

205

Insurance § 15-1208(b)

States that, a late enrollee in a health services plan
will not be subject to a waiting period for preexisting
conditions if "a court has ordered coverage to be provided for a spouse," or "a request for enrollment is
made within 30 days after the eligible employee's
marriage."
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206

Insurance § 15-1208.1 (c)

Requires small employer health benefit plans to offer
a special enrollment period such that "an individual
who becomes a dependent of the eligible employee
through marriage, ... an eligible employee who acquires a new dependent through marriage, ... [or]
the spouse of an eligible employee at the birth or
adoption of a child" can be enrolled under the health
benefit plan

207

Insurance § 15-1406.1 (c)

Requires a group health benefit plan that makes coverage available to dependents of an eligible employee
to offer a special enrollment period such that "an individual who becomes a dependent of the eligible employee through marriage, ... an eligible employee
who acquires a new dependent through marriage, ...
[or] the spouse of an eligible employee at the birth
or adoption of a child" can be enrolled under the
group health benefit plan

208

Insurance § 16-110(a)

Allows an insurer to pay the life insurance proceeds
of a resident of the state who dies intestate with an estate not exceeding $1,000 to the decedent's surviving
spouse without the grant of letters of administration
under certain circumstances

209

Insurance § 16-111 (a)

Exempts from creditors the proceeds of a policy of
life insurance made for the benefit of or assigned to
the spouse of an individual

210

Insurance § 16212(b) (1)(ii)

Allows for a clause to be included on a policy of life
insurance that allows the insurer to "make a payment
under the policy ... to any relative of the insured by
... connection by marriage."

211

Insurance § 16-305 (c)

Sets the cash surrender value of family life insurance
policies that "define [ ] a primary insured and provide [ ] term insurance on the life of the spouse of the
primary insured that expires before the spouse's age
71."

212

Insurance § 17-209(a), (c)

Allows group life insurance policies to "be extended
to cover the spouse ... of each insured employee"
and to provide rights of conversion to an insured
spouse if the policy terminates or is amended to terminate the spouse's coverage

213

Insurance § 20-519

Provides that, the suspension or revocation of a Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund policyholder's license cannot result in the cancellation of the coverage of a spouse included on the policy

214

Insurance § 20601(e)(l) (iii)

Prohibits an uninsured driver's spouse who lives in
the uninsured driver's household from submitting a
claim against the Maryland Automobile Insurance
Fund

Labor and Employment

Excludes a spouse of an employer from the requirement of minimum wage

215

§ 3-403 (a) (7)
216

Labor and Employment
§ 8-215(1)

Excludes employment for a spouse from covered employment with regard to unemployment insurance
benefits

122
No.

Baltimore Law Review
Provision Citation

[Vol. 35

Description of Provision

217

Labor and Employment
§ 8-220(b)

Excludes employment at an educational institution by
a spouse of a student enrolled and regularly attending classes at that institution from covered employment with regard to unemployment insurance benefits

218

Labor and Employment
§ 8-808.1

States that, alimony and spousal support can only be
withheld from unemployment insurance to the extent
provided under federal law

219

Labor and Employment
§ 8-1001 (d)(2)

Requires disqualification of an individual from receiving unemployment benefits "if an individual leaves
employment ... to accompany ... or to join a
spouse in a new location."

220

Labor and Employment
§ 9-509(d)

Allows a surviving spouse of a covered employee
killed as a result of the deliberate intent of the em·
ployer to bring a claim for worker's compensation

221

Labor and Employment
§ 9-632(d)(l)

Provides a surviving spouse of a covered employee
with a permanent partial disability who died with a Ie·
gal obligation to support that spouse with the right to
the unpaid worker's compensation due the employee

222

Labor and Employment
§ 9-640(d)(l)

Provides a surviving spouse of a covered employee
with a permanent total disability who died with a legal
obligation to support that spouse with the right to the
unpaid worker's compensation due the employee

223

Labor and Employment
§ 9-646(d)(l)

Provides a surviving spouse of a covered employee
with a hernia who died with a legal obligation to support that spouse with the right to the unpaid worker's
compensation due the employee

224

Labor and Employment
§ 9-680(a)

Precludes a surviving spouse of a covered employee
whose death was caused by an accidental personal injury or an occupational disease from receiving worker's compensation benefits if "the surviving spouse
deserts the covered employee for more than 1 year
before the time of the occurrence" of the accident or
disablement

225

Labor and Employment
§ 9-681 (d)

Requires an employer to continue to pay weekly
death benefits to a wholly dependent surviving spouse
who remains wholly dependent after $45,000 is paid,
for as long as the surviving spouse is totally dependent

226

Labor and Employment
§§ 9-681 (e), 9-682(a)

Requires an employer to continue to pay weekly
death benefits to a wholly dependent surviving spouse
who becomes wholly self·supporting before the em·
ployer pays $45,000 until $45,000 is paid, and requires an employer to pay weekly death benefits to a
partially self-supporting surviving spouse for the period of partial dependency or until $60,000 has been
paid

227

Labor and Employment
§ 9-681 (f)

Requires an employer to discontinue payment of
weekly death benefits to a wholly dependent surviving
spouse who remarries before $45,000 is paid unless
the surviving spouse does not have dependent children
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228

Labor and Employment
§ 9·682(d)

Requires an employer to continue payment of weekly
death benefits to a partially dependent surviving
spouse who remarries, does not have dependent children, and who had not received more than $60,000
before the remarriage

229

Natural Resources § 4604(d)(l)

Exempts a spouse of the owner or tenant of land bordering non tidal water or "the spouse of any child who
resides on the land with the owner or tenant when he
fishes in non tidal water adjoining his land" from the
requirement of an angler's license

230

Natural Resources § 4701 (i)(2)

Allows a tidal fishing license holder to transfer the Iicense to a spouse subject to the approval of the Department of Natural Resources

231

Natural Resources § 10301(b)

Exempts a spouse of the owner of farmland, tenant's
spouse, and the owner's and tenant's children's
spouse residing on the property from the requirement of a hunting license for farmland hunting only

232

Public Safety § 1-202(b) (a)

Provides a death benefit of $50,000 to be paid to the
surviving spouse of several kinds of public safety officers who are killed or die in the performance of
their duties

233

Public Safety § 1-202(d)

Prov;des a funeral benefit of $10,000 to be paid to
the surviving spouse of several kinds of public safety
officers who are killed or die in the perfonnance of
their duties

234

Public Safety § 5-136(a) (2)

Requires a spouse receiving a regulated firearm as a
gift from the purchasing spouse to "complete an application to purchase or transfer a regulated firearm;
and forward the application to the Secretary" of State
Police

235

Public Safety § 7-203

Requires the Board of Trustees of the Maryland State
Firemen's Association to pay a death benefit to a decedent member of a volunteer fire company or volunteer rescue squad's surviving spouse in certain circumstances

236

Public Safety §§ 7203(c) (l)(i), 7-209 (c) (3)

Provides that, a surviving spouse benefit is discontinued when the survivor remarnes

237

Public Safety § 14-212(a)

Precludes an action for eviction or distress from being
"brought against a person in emergency management
service or person suffering injury or damage if ...
the premises are occupied for dwelling purposes by
the spouse ... of the person in emergency management service or person suffering injury or damage."

238

Public Utility Companies
§ 2-303(a)-(b)

Prohibits the spouse of each commissioner, the Peopie's Counsel, the General Counsel, a hearing examiner, and each officer or employee of the Public Service Commission or Office of People's Counsel from
holding "an official relation to or connection with a
public service company" or having "a pecuniary interest in a public service company."
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239

Public Utility Companies
§ 2-307(a)-(b)

Prohibits the spouse of each commissioner, the Peopie's Counsel, the General Counsel, a hearing examiner, and each officer or employee of the Public Service Commission or Office of People's Counsel from
accepting "a gift, gratuity, or special consideration"
from a public service company or its officer, agent, or
employee

240

Public Utility Companies
§ 2-308(b)(l)

Prohibits "[aJ public service company or its officer,
agent, or employee" from offering "a gift, gratuity, or
special consideration" to the spouse of each commissioner, the People's Counsel, the General Counsel, a
hearing examiner, and each officer or employee of
the Public Service Commission or Office of People's
Counsel

241

Real Property § 4-108 (b)

Allows a husband and wife holding property as tenants by the entirety to avoid straw deeds by acting
jointly or individually to transfer to property interest
to another type of estate

242

Real Property §§ 7-301 Ul
to 7-321

Provides certain protections for a residence in foreclosure, defined as a residential real property consisting
of less than five single family dwelling units, "one of
which is occupied by the owner, or the owner's
spouse or former spouse under a use and possession
order issued under ... the Family Law Article, as the
individual's principal place of residence, and against
which an order to docket or a petition to foreclose
has been filed."

243

Real Property § 8-326

Subjects all goods on a leased premises naming husband or wife as tenant "to levy under distress to the
same extent as if both were named in the lease as tenants."

244

Real Property § 11138(d) (7)

Limits a local government's right to purchase a rental
facility transferred to a spouse

245

Real Property § 14-121(b),
(d)

Allows a spouse to request the owner of a burial site
to grant reasonable access to the burial site for the
purposes of restoring, maintaining, viewing, or transporting human remains for interment to a burial site

246

State Finance and Procurement § 13-221 (b)(2),
(c)(I)

Includes any interests held by an individual's spouse
as interests held by that individual for purposes of disclosures to the Secretary of State regarding information about businesses contracting with the State for
$100,000 or more

247

State Finance and Procurement §§ 14-301 (g), 14302(a)(7)

States that, "[iJf, during the performance of a contract, a certified minority business enterprise contractor or subcontractor becomes ineligible to participate
in the Minority Business Enterprise Program because
one or more of its owners has a personal net worth,"
which includes in an individual's personal net worth
any share of assets held jointly or as community property with the individual's spouse, that exceeds
$750,000, "that ineligibility alone may not cause the
termination of the certified minority business enterprise's contractual relationship for the remainder of
the term of the contract; and the certified minority
business enterprise's participation under the contract
shall continue to be counted toward the program and
contract goals."
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248

State Government § 2107(b) (1)

Prohibits a member of the General Assembly from
employing a member's spouse or a spouse of a another member from the same legislative district for legislative business "using public funds over which the
member has direct contro!."

249

State Government § 9123(2)

Prohibits a spouse of an officer or employee of the
State Lottery Agency who resides in the principal residence of the officer or employee from buying a state
lottery ticket or receiving a prize

250

State Government §§ 15102(s), 15-512(a) (l )(i) (2)

States that, a disqualification of a member of the General Assembly from participating in any legislative action because of a conflict with the public interest cannot be suspended if the conflict is direct and personal
to a member of the legislator's immediate family,
which includes a spouse

251

State Government §§ 15102(s), 15-513(b)(3)

Requires a legislator to report in writing to the Joint
Ethics Committee "the name of any business enterprise subject to regulation by a State agency in which
the legislator and ... spouse ... together or separately" have a certain amount of financial interest

252

State Government §§ 15102(s), 15-607(e)(l)

Exempts a member of the General Assembly from filing a financial disclosure statement regarding any gift
received from the member's spouse

253

State Government §§ 15102(s), 15-704(b)(2)(vi)

Requires a regulated lobbyist to "file with the Ethics
Commission, under oath and for each registration, a
separate report concerning the regulated lobbyist's
lobbying activities" including "total expenditures in
connection with influencing executive action or legislative action" such as meals and beverages for members of the immediate families, including spouses, of
officials or employees

254

State Government §§ 15102(s), 15-705(a)

Requires a regulated lobbyist to file a separate report
disclosing the name of a member of the lobbyist's immediate family, including a spouse, "of a State official
of the Executive Branch who has benefitted during
the reporting period from gifts of meals or beverages
from the regulated lobbyist, whether or not in connection with lobbying activities."

255

State Government §§ 15102(s), 15-710

Exempts a regulated lobbyist from disclosing gifts to
the regulated lobbyist'S immediate family, including a
spouse, "if the gift is: purely personal and private in
nature and not related to the regulated lobbyist'S lobbying activities; and from the regulated lobbyist's personal funds and not attributable to any other entity or
entities."

256

State Government § 15505(c) (2) (x) (1)

Exempts an official or employee of State government
from the general prohibition on solicitation or acceptance of gifts if the "gift is from ... an individual related to the official or employee by blood or marriage."

257

State Government § 15608(a) (1)

Includes an interest held by a spouse of an individual
to be reported as an interest of that individual in
§ 15-607
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258

State Government § 15849(a)(2)(i)

Requires a spouse who has made contributions to the
treasurer of a candidate or a political committee "having a cumulative value of $500 or more during the
48-month period before the application was filed or
during the pendency of the application," to file a disclosure providing certain information

259

State Government § 19111(a)

Allows a spouse of a person serving in the armed
forces of the United States to acknowledge an instrument

260

State Personnel and Pensions § 2-307(a)

Prohibits a state employee from directly supervising
the employee's spouse

261

State Personnel and Pensions § 2-507(b)

Allows a "surviving spouse of a State employee who
died while employed by the State" to enroll and participate in the State Employee and Retiree Health
and Welfare Benefits Program

262

State Personnel and Pensions § 2-508(b)(2)

Allows a surviving spouse of a deceased retiree to enroll and participate in the State Employee and Retiree
Health and Welfare Benefits Program

263

State Personnel and Pensions § 2-509 (a) (3)

Allows a surviving spouse of a State employee with optional retirement to enroll and participate in the
State Employee and Retiree Health and Welfare Benefits Program

264

State Personnel and Pensions § 2-511 (b), (c)

Allows a surviving spouse of an employee or former
employee of the Maryland Environmental Service and
Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Authority to enroll and participate in the State Employee and Retiree
Health and Welfare Benefits Program

265

State Personnel and Pensions § 2-514(a)

Provides a special enrollment period in the State Employee and Retiree Health and Welfare Benefits Program "for a nonparticipating State employee after the
death of a spouse who was not a State employee."

266

State Personnel and Pensions § 7-207(c)(2)

Provides "the spouse of an eligible veteran who has a
service connected disability; or ... the surviving
spouse of a deceased eligible veteran" with ten points
on any selection test for an appointment in skilled or
professional se,,~ce

267

State Personnel and Pensions § 9-604

States that, "[aln employee may voluntarily donate
unused annual, sick, or personal leave to another employee who has exhausted all available annual, personal, sick, and compensatory leave because of a serious and prolonged medical condition of the employee or a catastrophic illness or injury of a member of
the employee's immediate family."

268

State Personnel and Pensions § 10-404(c) (1) (i)

Provides a death benefit of $100,000 to the surviving
spouse of certain state employees

269

State Personnel and Pensions § 10-404(c)(2) (i)

Provides a death benefit of $50,000 to the surviving
spouse of certain state employees

270

State Personnel and Pensions § 21-401 (a)(2)

Allows a member of the Law Enforcement Officers
Pension System, State Police Retirement System, or
Judges' Retirement System to elect a reduced allowance to be paid instead of the basic allowance provided by the system only if the member is not married at
the time of retirement
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271

State Personnel and Pensions § 21-503(2)

Requires the Board of Trustees to offer counseling regarding retirement benefits to an immediate family
member if a member, former member or retiree in
the State Retirement and Pension System consents

272

State Personnel and Pensions § 21-602(b)

Allows a surviving spouse of a member, former member, or retiree in the State Retirement and Pension
System to "elect to have all or any part of the eligible
rollover distribution to be paid in a direct rollover to
an individual retirement account."

273

State Personnel and Pensions § 22-305(a)(4)

Allows "[t)he surviving spouse of a member of the
Teachers' Retirement System [to) pay for the appropriate final adjustment" in certain circumstances

274

State Personnel and Pensions § 22-405(e), (f)

Allows the surviving spouse of a retired Governor or a
Governor who died while in office to receive one-half
of the Governor's retirement allowance

275

State Personnel and Pensions § 23-308(e)

Allows the surviving spouse of a member of the
Teachers' Pension System who was making alternative
methods of payment for service credit to pay for the
appropriate final adjustment in certain circumstances

276

State Personnel and Pensions § 24-401.1 (i)(2)(i)

States that, a surviving spouse is a deSignated beneficiary of a member of the Deferred Retirement Option
Program in the State Police Retirement System

277

State Personnel and Pensions § 24-403(b)(l)

Requires the Board of Trustees of the State Police Retirement System to pay 50% of a deceased retiree's retirement allowance to a surviving spouse

278

State Personnel and Pensions § 24-404(a)(2)(i),
(3) (i)

Requires the Board of Trustees of the State Police Retirement System to pay of a deceased retiree's special
disability retirement allowance, service retirement allowance, or ordinary disability retirement allowance to
a surviving spouse

279

State Personnel and Pensions § 26-401.1 (i)(2)(i)

States that, a surviving spouse is a designated beneficiary of a member of the Deferred Retirement Option
Program in the Law Enforcement Officers' Pension
System

280

State Personnel and Pensions § 26-402 (b) (1)

Requires the Board of Trustees of the Law Enforcement Officers' Pension System to pay 50% of a deceased retiree's retirement allowance to a surviving
spouse

281

State Personnel and Pensions § 27-103

States that, Title 27, outlining the Judges' Retirement
System, "does not impair or reduce any benefit that a
... spouse of a member, former member, or retiree
has been or would be entitled to receive under any
public general law."

282

State Personnel and Pensions § 27-403(a), (b)

Requires the Board of Trustees of the Judges' Retirement System to pay 50% of the retirement allowance
of a member, former member, or retiree to the surviving spouse

283

State Personnel and Pensions § 27-404

States that, the "payment of an allowance ends and
further rights may not arise from service as a member
[of the Judges' Retirement System)" if the member
does not leave a surviving spouse or the surviving
spouse dies and there are no children of the member
under 18 years of age

Baltimore Law Review

128
No.

Provision Citation

[Vol. 35

Description of Provision

284

State Personnel and Pensions § 27-407(b)

Prohibits a county from paying a supplement to a surviving spouse of a member, former member, or retiree of the Judges' Retirement System

285

State Personnel and Pensions § 29-203(a) (2) (i) (1)

Requires the Board of Trustees of the Law Enforcement Officers' Pension System to pay 50% of the ordinary disability retirement allowance of a member to
the surviving spouse in certain circumstances

286

State Personnel and Pensions § 29-204(a) (2)

Requires the Board of Trustees of the State Police Retirement System to pay the accumulated contributions
to the designated beneficiary and 50% of the average
final compensation of a member to the surviving
spouse in certain circumstances

287

State Personnel and Pensions § 29-205

Allows a surviving spouse of a member of the Correctional Officers' Retirement System, Employees' Retirement System, Local Fire and Police System, or Teachers' Retirement System to elect to receive the death
benefit or an allowance equal to the amount payable
under Option 2 of the optional allowances under certain circumstances

288

State Personnel and Pensions § 29-206

Allows a surviving spouse of a member of the Employee's Pension System, Teachers' Pension System, or the
Local Fire and Police System to elect to receive the
death benefit or an allowance equal to the amount
payable under Option 2 of the optional allowances
under certain circumstances

289

State Personnel and Pensions §§ 29-4lO to 29-413

Sets out the manner in which unlimited adjustments
are computed and minimum benefits are awarded for
the surviving spouse of a member of certain retirement systems

290

State Personnel and Pensions §§ 29-416 to 29-418

Sets out th~ manner in which five percent limited adjustments are computed for the surviving spouse of a
member of certain retirement systems

291

State Personnel and Pensions §§ 29-421, 29-422

Sets out the manner in which combinations adjustments are determined for the surviving spouse of a
member of certain retirement systems

292

Tax General § 7-203(b) (2)

Exempts "a spouse of the decedent ... a spouse of a
child of the decedent or a spouse of a lineal descendant of a child of the decedent" from the inheritance
tax

293

Tax General § 7203(k) (2) (ii)

Exempts a spouse of a Holocaust victim from the inheritance tax on "amounts received by a decedent as
reparations or restitution for loss of liberty or damage
to health."

294

Tax General § 7-209 (c) (2)

States that, "[w]hen property passes from a decedent
to a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties and
only 1 spouse is entitled to the [inheritance tax] exemption," 50% of property is exempt from taxation
and the remaining 50% is subject to the tax

295

Tax General § 10-207(e1) (2)

States that, the subtraction from the federal adjusted
gross income to determine Maryland adjusted gross
income "includes a payment from a pension system to
the surviving spouse ... of a law enforcement officer
or fire fighter whose death arises out of or in the
course of employment."
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296

Tax General § 10207(r) (2)

States that, the subtraction from the federal adjusted
gross income to determine Maryland adjusted gross
income "includes the lesser of $1,200 or the modified
Maryland adjusted gross income of the spouse with
the lesser modified Maryland adjusted gross income"
for a two-income married couple filing a joint tax return

297

Tax General § 10207(t)(2) (ii)

States that, the subtraction from the federal adjusted
gross income to determine Maryland adjusted gross
income includes "amounts received by an individual
as reparations or restitution for loss of liberty or damage to health" because he or she is a spouse of a Holocaust victim

298

Tax General § 10-209(b)

States that, the subtraction from the federal adjusted
gross income equal to the lesser of certain retirement
benefits to determine Maryland adjusted gross income
is allowed if a Maryland resident's spouse is totally disabled

299

Tax General § 1O-217(c)

Sets out the amounts of the standard deduction to
compute Maryland taxable income for an individual
described as a surviving spouse and for spouses filing
a joint return

300

Tax General § 10-709(a),
(b)

Allows an eligible low income taxpayer's spouse filing
a joint tax return to claim a credit against the state
income tax for a taxable year

301

Tax General § 1O-718(b)

Allows an individual to "claim a credit against the
State income tax in an amount equal to 100% of the
eligible long-term care premiums paid by the individual during the taxable year for long-term care insurance covering ... the individual's spouse."

302

Tax General § 10-807

Requires that, "a husband and wife who file ajoint
federal income tax return shall file a joint Maryland
income tax return" except in certain circumstances

303

Tax General § 10808(c) (2)

Requires an indi~idual's surviving spouse to file their
decedent spouse's tax return if there is no personal
represen tative

304

Tax General § 13-905(b)

Requires the Comptroller to pay a claim of refund to
the estate of a decedent if the decedent's tax return
was filed jointly by the surviving spouse and the personal representative

305

Tax Property § 7-207(c)

Exempts the dwelling house of a surviving spouse of a
blind individual from property tax if the house had
formerly been exempt

306

Tax Property § 7-208(b),
(c), (g), (h)

Exempts the dwelling house of a surviving spouse of a
disabled veteran from property tax given certain requirements and authorizes refunds of property tax
not exempted as well as interest for such tax assessed

307

Tax Property §§ 8-226 to 8228

Provides homeowners, including spouses and former
spouses who have been permitted under a court order or separation agreement to reside in a dwelling in
which they have interest, with an application process
to rezone real property as residential real property for
property assessment purposes, with an exception stating that for spouses that transfer rezoned real property, the property ceases to be rezoned
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30S

Tax Property § 9-101 (f)

Allows an unmarried surviving spouse of a homeowner to claim a property tax credit for elderly or disabled homeowners

309

Tax Property § 9-104(h)

Allows an unmarried surviving spouse of a homeowner to claim a property tax credit for eligible homeowners

310

Tax Property § 9-210(b)

Allows "[tJhe Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
City or the governing body of a county or municipal
corporation" to grant a property tax credit "against
the county or municipal corporation property tax imposed on a dwelling that is owned by a surviving
spouse of a fallen law enforcement officer or rescue
worker."

311

Tax Property § 1210S(c)(1), (d)

Exempts a spouse or former spouse from the recordation tax if property subject to a mortgage or deed of
trust, or an instrument of writing that transfers property, is transferred to a spouse or former spouse

312

Tax Property § 13207(a)(2), (3)

Exempts a spouse or former spouse from the transfer
tax if property subject to a mortgage or deed of trust,
or an instrument of writing that transfers property, is
transferred to a spouse or former spouse

313

Tax Property § 13-403

Exempts a spouse or former spouse from the county
transfer tax if an instrument of writing that transfers
property in accordance with a property settlement or
divorce decree is transferred to a spouse or former
spouse

314

Transportation § 8-309(i)

Establishing the right of a former owner, including a
decedent's surviving spouse, to reacquire land to be
conveyed by the Board of Public Works

315

Transportation § 13-11S

Requires a person whose name has changed by marriage to both notify and apply for a corrected certificate of title for a vehicle at the Motor Vehicle Administration within 30 days of the change

316 Transportation § 13-414(b)

Requires a person "who has applied for or obtained
the registration of a vehicle" and whose name has
changed by marriage to notify the Motor Vehicle Administration within 30 days and "apply for a corrected
registration certificate."

317

Transportation 13-503.1

Allows a married couple to execute certain kinds of
transfers of vehicle registration plates and enable the
transferee to continue using the transferred plates

31S

Transportation § 13-619

Allows a surviving spouse of a member of an eligible
organization to apply for a special registration number

319

Transportation § 13S10(c)(1)(i), (5)

Exempts a vehicle from the excise tax on the transfer
of the vehicle and subsequent issuance of a certificate
of title to a spouse, or a former spouse as a result of
divorce or separation

320

Transportation § 13903(a)(9)

Exempts a vehicle from registration fees if the vehicle
is "owned and personally used by an individual who is
at least 65 years old and is the surviving spouse of a
deceased disabled veteran."
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321

Transportation § 16-116(b)

Requires a person who has applied for or obtained a
driver's license and whose name has changed by marriage to notify the Motor Vehicle Administration within 30 days in writing

322

Transportation § 23106(a) (2) (i)

Exempts a spouse from providing the inspection certificate when transferring a used automobile to another spouse

323

Article 2B § 8-217(a)(l)

Making it unlawful in Prince George's County for any
person under the age of 18 years, between 10:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m., to be on the premises of the holder of
any Class B or Class D alcohol license, unless the person is in the immediate company of a designated person, including his or her spouse

324

Article 2B § 9-212(c)(4)

In Garrett County, a surviving spouse that holds a deceased licensee's alcohol license is exempt from any
issuing fees on the license

325

Article 2B § 10-506(b)

Provides that, "[u]pon the death of any married [alcohol] licensee, ... a new license shall be issued to
the surviving spouse," who may also be eligible for a
renewal license

326

Article 2B § 11-502(h)

In Anne Arundel County, no person under the age of
18 is allowed on the premises of any bowling alley
with a Class B or Class D alcohol license between 2:00
a.m. and 6:00 a.m., unless the person is accompanied
by a designated individual, including his or her
spouse

327

Article 25 § 3(g-l)

Various pension plans for Charles County employees,
contain disability provisions and death benefits for
spouses and/or minor children

328

Article 25 § 3 (pp) (1 )-(2)

If the Board of Commissioners of Calvert County establishes a pension plan for the Calvert County Sheritrs Department, the plan shall include death benefits
for spouses and children

329

Article 25 § 51(j)(3)

States that, in Garrett County, "[t]he deputy treasurer
may not be related to the County Treasurer by blood
or marriage."

330

Article 28 § 2-115(a)(l)

No commissioner on the Maryland-National Capital
Park and Planning Commission may "knowingly participate in a decision affecting the financial interest of
a person related to the commissioner or the commissioner's spouse."

331

Article 28 § 5-105.1

Whenever the Maryland-National Capital Park and
Planning Commission acquires real property that results in the displacement of a person from his place
of business or farm, eligible persons are entitled to a
payment equal to the average annual net earnings,
"includ[ ] ling] any compensation paid by the business or farm operation to the owner, [or] his spouse,"
of the business or farm operation displaced

332

Article 41 § 6-7A03(e)(2)(ii)(4)

Under the Community Attendant Services and Supports Program, of the Department of Human Resources, the consumer's spouse is "barred from receiving medical assistance payments for providing services."
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333

Article 668 § 5.03(d) (2)

Refers to Real Property Code § 14-121's provision regarding access to a burial site and the granting of an
easement to an individual who is related to the interred by blood or marriage

334

Article 708 § 1 (c)

Defining "congregate housing services" as "services
provided in an apartment building that promote independent living and include congregate meals, housekeeping, and personal services for ... an individual
at least 62 years old who has temporary or periodic
difficulty with one or more essential activities of daily
living," and the spouse of a person previously described who is at least 55 years old and who has difficulty with life activities as well

335

Article 708 § 26

For the purposes of the Senior Citizens Activities Centers Capital Improvement Grants Program, projects
that receive grants shall be for "elderly citizens," defined as "a person 60 years old or older or a spouse
of a person 60 years old or older."

336 Article 838 § 2-611 (i)

The Maryland Home Financing Program permits the
" [t]ransfer of the mortgaged property or an interest
therein without monetary consideration to a spouse,
child, or other immediate family member, or in connection with the death of a borrower, a divorce decree, or a legal separation agreement."

337

Article 88A § 77

On the death of any recipient of public assistance,
the amount of assistance paid "shall be allowed as a
claim against the estate ... [but] no such claim shall
be enforced against any real estate ... while it is occupied by the recipient's surviving spouse or dependents."

338

Article 88A § 85(b)

Under the Department of Human Resources, Community Home Care Services, "elderly persons" is defined as those of at least 65 years of age, and their
spouses regardless of their age

339

Article 96 1/2 § 48

Special credit and merits may be extended to the
spouses of veterans for the purposes of appointment
to positions in municipal or county government made
by merit based system

